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Introduction
In the cold and rain of the Malvinas Islands, young Argentine Jewish conscript Silvio
Katz laid on the ground, bound to four stakes.1 Above him stood several young Argentines of the
same age as Katz, forced to urinate on him while military superiors stood in the background
watching.2 The only factor differentiating Katz from his fellow conscripts was his Jewish
heritage, but it was precisely because of this factor that Katz became victim and his fellow
conscripts abusers. It did not matter that Katz, like most Jewish conscripts serving in the 1982
Malvinas War against Great Britain, was born in Argentina and spoke Spanish at home. The
antisemitism he experienced in 1982 while forming part of the Argentine military built on a long
history of othering the Jewish community in Argentina. The creation of a non-Argentine other in
the Jewish community, throughout the 20th century, was a central element of the formation of
Argentine nationalism and identity for liberal, populist, and military governments alike. By
targeting Jewish conscripts with harsh physical and verbal abuse during the Malvinas War,
Argentine military superiors signaled to both Jewish and non-Jewish conscripts that Jews were a
not fully Argentine other. It represented a performative antisemitism that formed a sense of unity
among the conscripts forced to abuse Katz, construing a common identity in opposition to the
Jewish victim. Argentine nationalism and identity, when linked to Catholicism, similarly were
constructed in opposition to the Jewish community. This project examines this idea, and how the
Jewish community remained a non-Argentine, politically radical, and secularizing other in the
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eyes of the conservative military government of the 1970s and 1980s, building on the conception
of a Jewish other in the early and mid-20th century.
Chapter 1 describes the beginning of the process of othering the Jewish community in the
early and mid-20th century. It highlights a so-called “Jewish Question”, which for Argentine
elites, the Catholic Church, and the military, represented the idea that the Jewish presence in
Argentina was a “problem” threatening to corrupt the traditional bases of Argentine society. The
framing of the Jewish Question responded to the growing economic success of Jewish
immigrants, the arrival of new ideologies like communism and anarchism in Argentina, and
concerns over uncontrolled immigration. Because of these ideas, the Jewish community became
a politically radical, secularizing, and “non-Argentine” other living in the country. In some cases
in the 20th century, this Jewish Question provided social actors the opportunity to maintain or
emphasize their position of power, while in other cases it allowed them to demonstrate a break
with traditional Argentine politics. The othering of Jews meant that antisemitism operated
largely untouched by Argentine governments throughout this period, a reality governments
beginning in the 1950s began to respond to. Such governments, eager to maintain positive
relations with the United States, attempted to show that they had eradicated or were opposed to
antisemitism, while at the same time allowing antisemitic organizations to form part of their
political base.
Chapter 2 shifts to the main period of study of this project, the military dictatorship that
led Argentina from 1976 to 1983. During this period, military leaders maintained the idea of the
Jewish community as a politically radical, secularizing, and “foreign” other, using it to access
power and construct an Argentine identity linked to Catholicism. More extreme members of the
military even highlighted the Jewish community as a threat to Argentine sovereignty,
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capitalizing on such a belief to justify their stay in power and slow the eventual transition to
democracy. Other, more moderate leaders, emulated the strategy of earlier governmental actors
by expressing to the United States their opposition to antisemitism. This strategy not only
improved relations with the United States during the Cold War but also allowed these more
“moderate” military leaders to access power within a divided institution.
Chapter 3 focuses on the experience of Jewish conscripts like Silvio Katz during the
Malvinas War at the end of the military dictatorship. It shows how the military leaders in power
at the time attempted to consolidate a national identity and sense of unity linked to Catholicism.
Such an ideological project necessitated the exclusion and marginalization of the Jewish
community, as demonstrated by the antisemitic mistreatment of Jewish conscripts like Katz
serving in the military during the war. In this way, the Malvinas War, and the Catholic
nationalist discourse surrounding it, represented a continuation of the idea of the Jewish
community as a foreign, politically radical, and secularizing other living in Argentina.
Jewish Immigration to Argentina
Jewish immigration to Argentina formed part of the mass wave of movement from
Europe and the Middle East to the Americas at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th
centuries. No country, save perhaps the United States, would face such a profound change as
Argentina during this mass wave of migration. By 1914, Argentina had proportionally the largest
foreign-born population in all the Americas.3 With one in three Argentines foreign-born at the
time, the South American nation was truly a cultural melting pot. Although the bulk of the
immigrants to Argentina at the time came from Southern Europe, particularly Italy and Spain,
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Jozami, Gladys, Daniel Bargman, and Mirta Bialogorski, “Arabs, Jews and Koreans in Argentina: A
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many Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe would arrive as well.4 Roughly 115,000 Jewish
individuals were living in Argentina, a country of 7 million in 1914, with the community’s
population continuing to grow in the following decade.5 By 1934, roughly a quarter of a million
Jews called Argentina home.6 With the last wave of Jewish immigrants arriving in the 1950s, the
population of the community remained fairly steady at around 300,000, slightly over 1 % of the
total population, through the beginning of the military junta in 1976.7 Although these Jewish
Argentines came from a variety of countries across Europe and the Middle East, they can be
divided into three groups according to their geographic origin and time of arrival in Argentina.
The first of such Jewish immigrant groups arrived from Morocco in the mid-19th century.
Most Moroccan Jews who arrived in Argentina in this period were descendants of Jews from
Spain (Sephardic Jews), with some already speaking a form of Spanish before arrival in South
America.8 Their move to Argentina corresponded with a process of mass movement from
Morocco’s interior to urban environments both locally and abroad. The second group of
Argentine Jews arrived beginning in the 1880s, largely from Russia. A series of pogroms had
targeted the Jewish population there, leading to mass immigration to the Western Hemisphere,
including Argentina. Many Argentine emissaries were stationed in Russia, encouraging families
to move to the South American nation. By World War I, Jews arriving from Poland also
represented a significant portion of this second group of Jewish immigrants, with some coming
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Fitzgerald, David Scott, and David Cook-Martín, "Argentina: Crucible of European Nations?" In Culling the
Masses, 230. Harvard University Press, 2014.
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Graciela Ben-Dror, The Catholic Church and the Jews: Argentina, 1933-1945 (Lincoln, Neb: University of
Nebraska Press, 2009), 8.
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Ibid. 10.
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Raanan Rein, Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines? Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Diaspora, Jewish Identities
in a Changing World, v. 12 (Leiden [The Netherlands]  ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 31.
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to Argentina after being denied entry to the United States.9 Both Russian and Polish Jewish
immigrants to Argentina were fairly similar culturally as both were Ashkenazi (Eastern
European) Jewish communities, and far outnumbered both the Moroccan Jewish population and
the small community of Syrian Jewish immigrants that arrived from the Ottoman Empire.
The descendants of Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants would thus dominate Jewish cultural
institutions in Argentina, and would assimilate into Argentine society. Many Ashkenazi Jews
were fairly secular and by the mid-20th century often intermarried with non-Jewish Argentines.10
Given this, throughout the mid-20th century, and by the beginning of the military dictatorship in
1976, most descendants of Jewish immigrants were Spanish speakers, active politically and
economically in society, and generally felt a sense of belonging in Argentina. To the military
leaders of the 1970s and 1980s, described in the following section, even these fully assimilated
Jewish families and individuals remained a foreign, politically radical, and secularizing other,
threatening the traditional bases of Argentine society.
From the Dirty War to the Malvinas War: Division in the Argentine Military (1976-1983)
The military government that took control of the country in a 1976 coup was quick to
establish alliances with different sectors of Argentine society, like the Catholic Church and
certain business leaders. At least initially, there was little disagreement within the institution over
the military’s role in leading the country, although significant tension would arise later on during
the dictatorship. The conservative leaders of the military viewed Argentina as an inherently
Catholic country and largely subscribed to a Catholic nationalist ideology that rejected liberalism
and in some cases democracy.11 The coup’s leaders cited the political turbulence of the preceding
9

Ben-Dror, The Catholic Church and the Jews, 12.
Ibid. 10.
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James P Brennan, Argentina's Missing Bones: Revisiting the History of the Dirty War (Oakland, CA: University
of California Press, 2018), 25.
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6
years as the cause behind the military’s actions. The mid-1970s had indeed been turbulent,
marked by the return of popular nationalist leader Juan Perón from exile in Spain and growing
political extremism on both the left and right.12 Such political extremism included violent
insurgencies by left-leaning armed groups like Montoneros and ERP (El Ejército Revolucionario
del Pueblo) and frequent attacks by right-leaning paramilitary groups, fostering a tense
atmosphere that seemed destined to end in civil war.
The military as an institution generally agreed that the best response to such political
extremism was to violently suppress armed organizations operating in the country. Instead of
removing violent actors on both the left and the right, however, the military would incorporate
right-leaning paramilitary groups into their repressive apparatus.13 In addition to waging
extensive counterinsurgency campaigns against Montoneros and ERP, the military also began a
sort of cultural war against “revolutionary” thought and ideas in what they coined the “Process of
National Reorganization”. This consisted of censoring any materials they felt were linked to such
“revolutionary” thought, which meant that universities in particular faced harsh repression, with
certain disciplines like sociology and psychology removed or heavily reformed to align with the
more conservative, narrow worldview of the military leaders.14 In addition to this form of
repression, instead of arresting individuals they believed were associated with leftism and
“dangerous” ideas like communism, the military simply “erased” them from society as a whole,
placing them in detention centers, assassinating them and piling them into mass graves without
identification, or casting them into the River Plate. Such individuals would be known as
“disappeared” Argentines, or desaparecidos, and were a clear example of the brutal human rights
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Jerry Dávila, Dictatorship in South America (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 73-74.
Ibid. 78.
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violations that occurred in this period at the hands of the military.15 Over 30,000 Argentines
would suffer this fate, while almost 5% of the country would leave during the military
dictatorship through politically motivated exile.16
The military, however, was far from united in this period, even during the so-called Dirty
War of 1976 to 1978 when many of the dictatorship’s worst human rights violations occurred.17
Significant disagreement existed between and within each of the three branches of the military,
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, over how to run the country. Military leaders, including the
heads of the three branches at the time of the coup, Jorge Rafael Videla (Army), Emilio Massera
(Navy), and Orlando Agostí (Air Force), differed in their view of state repression, political
ideology, economics, foreign policy, and a range of other issues. As the dictatorship progressed,
strong rifts would appear within the institution, especially as military leaders debated over the
future and whether they should begin a transition towards democracy or maintain the military’s
position of power.18 This rift would center around a split within the military between a more
“moderate” sector and a more hardline, extremist sector.
In order to understand the internal tension within the military regime, it is important to
explain first how that regime functioned and structured itself. Although there were no checks and
balances restricting the power of the military as a whole, several organizational factors ultimately
limited the power of various individuals in the military government. In 1976, after the military
took power, the leaders of the three branches formed a junta, with Videla, the head of the Army,
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Luis Alberto Romero and James P. Brennan, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century: Updated and
Revised Edition (Baltimore, MD: Project MUSE, 2015), 232-233.
16
Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture (Oxford University Press,
2011), 185.
17
Benjamín García Holgado and Nicolás Taccone, “Diseño institucional e inestabilidad presidencial en
autoritarismos: El proceso de reorganización nacional en la Argentina (1976-1983),” Desarrollo Económico 58, no.
224 (2018): 9.
18
Romero and Brennan, A History of Argentina, 241.
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assuming the presidency shortly afterwards. However, there was significant opposition within
the Navy to the comparative power of the Army with Videla as president. Because of this, in
1977 the various generals of the three branches began to discuss how to lessen the power of the
Army and the president. The solution would be for Videla to retire as head of the Army, but
maintain the presidency, with a new junta formed with the new head of the Army, head of the
Navy, and head of the Air Force.19 Beginning in 1978, this structure, with the president and
military junta essentially sharing power, would define the military government through the early
1980s and the beginning of the transition towards democracy in late 1982.
The purpose of the military junta was to split power between the three branches, with the
goal of preventing the dominance of the Army within the institution. However, the junta was also
a reflection of the deep divisions within the military. Not only did its formation demonstrate the
tension between the Army and Navy, and particularly between Videla and the head of the Navy
Emilio Massera, it showed the lack of political consensus within the institution. The junta,
furthermore, greatly limited the power of the president, who could not enact any legislation or
take any action without its approval.20 Such a structure fostered indecision, and caused Videla as
president to seek out allies within the Army and in the junta itself to maintain power. One such
ally would be Roberto Viola, head of the Army in 1978 and thus a member of the junta in that
year. Videla’s desire for an ally within the military’s leading governmental body, however,
reflected greater division than that which existed between the Navy and the Army.
Among the causes of division within the institution were disputes over economic,
political, domestic, and foreign policy. Videla and Viola, and much of the Army, supported the

19
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Holgado and Taccone, “Diseño insitucional”, 10.
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imposition of a neoliberal, free market economy in the style of their neighbors Chile.21 This
sector valued a strong relationship with the United States, and Viola would later advocate for a
transition towards democracy.22 That is not to say that this sector of the military was prodemocracy or “liberal”, as it still was supportive of and complicit in the large-scale repression
that occurred between 1976 and 1978. Nevertheless, their views were less hardline than those of
much of the Navy, including Massera, and portions of the Air Force and the Army. This more
hardline sector of the military rejected a transition towards democracy, did not trust the United
States as an ally, was expansionist, advocated for a state-run economy, and was drawn to
antisemitic discourse.23 The last few years of Videla’s presidency would be marked by a power
struggle between these factions, and the different generals of the three branches. The fact that
Videla remained in power until 1981, despite the significant opposition to his presidency that
existed within the military, reflected the alliances he fostered within the junta, the Army, with
business interests domestically, and with the United States.
The end of Videla’s term as president in 1981 would represent a shift in the balance
between hardline and more “moderate” sectors of the military. Although Viola, Videla’s ally
within the Army, would be chosen by the junta as the new president, the composition of the junta
would shift to be dominated by hardline members of the military.24 Viola, therefore, struggled to
find allies even within the Army, particularly given the presence of Leopoldo Galtieri as the
representative of the Army within the junta. Galtieri and the head of the Navy at the time, Jorge
Anaya, opposed Viola’s economic policies and desire to open dialogue with political parties, and

21
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as his presidency progressed increasingly looked for ways to push him out.25 Anaya hoped to win
back more power and resources for the Navy, and was a strong advocate for a military invasion
of the Malvinas Islands. With the support of the head of the Air Force, the three used Viola’s
health issues, arising at the end of 1981, as a pretext to stage an internal coup. Galtieri would be
named as the next president, and Viola would be forced into retirement.26 The hardline, extremist
wing of the military had control of the presidency and the junta.
Galtieri’s presidency would bring the invasion and war over the Malvinas Islands,
explored in Chapter 3. Argentina’s defeat in the war would ultimately be one of the causes of the
military’s eventual exit from power, and the return to democracy in 1983.27 Regardless, both
Galtieri and Videla’s presidencies demonstrated the division, both ideological and between
branches, existent within the military. As analyzed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, antisemitism
played a part, just as it did for previous Argentine governments, as different military leaders
sought to access power. Catholic nationalism also helped military leaders access and maintain a
position of power. In the end, both the use of antisemitism and Catholic nationalism as “tools”
for accessing power during the military dictatorship marginalized and harmed Argentina’s
Jewish community, reflecting an idea, evident throughout the 20th century, of the Jewish
community as an other within Argentina.

25
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Chapter 1: The Jewish Question in 20th Century Argentina
Argentina’s Jewish community, throughout the 20th century, represented an important
minority population within the South American nation. Certain Buenos Aires neighborhoods like
Once and Villa Crespo at times consisted of majority Jewish populations, with the Jewish
community representing between 1 and 2 percent of the total Argentine population for much of
the 20th century.28 Despite the minority status of Argentina’s Jews, their presence in mostly
urban areas like Buenos Aires, early economic success, and different cultural background to the
European Catholics who made up the majority of early immigrants to Argentina, meant that
different Argentine governments and social actors would give special attention to the Jewish
immigrant community. Their view of and conversations over the Jewish community and the
main issues relating to that community were responses to an Argentine “Jewish Question”, a
term used in Europe to debate the position and status of Jewish communities in European
societies.29 In Argentina, as in Europe, leading governments and social actors viewed the Jewish
population as a “problem” that threatened to corrupt the traditional bases of Argentine society.
This Jewish “problem” centered on developments within the Jewish immigrant community, like
their economic progress, political views, and influence on the rest of society. These traditional
bases of Argentine society, like the Catholic Church and the dominance of the upper-class urban
elite, defined the Jewish Question throughout much of the 20th century, and used it as a tool that
could shape Argentine society and identity.
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In periods that represented a break from traditional Argentine politics, like under
nationalist leader Juan Perón in the 1940s and 1950s, the Jewish community’s inclusion in
politics would be highlighted to demonstrate a rupture with conservative elements of Argentine
society. This inclusion would couple with efforts to voice opposition to antisemitism, particularly
to improve relations with the United States. By the 1960s, even conservative military
governments attempted to prove that they opposed antisemitism, in the form of violent attacks on
the Jewish community by far-right nationalist organizations in Argentina, while including those
same groups within their political base. This chapter examines how powerful actors in three
different periods of Argentine history defined the Jewish Question and responded to
antisemitism, capitalizing on shifting conceptions of the Jewish Question and social realities to
serve their own political and social interests.
The Semana Trágica of 1919
In 1919, a group of police, soldiers, and upper-class Argentines entered one of Buenos
Aires’ Jewish-majority neighborhoods, looting stores, burning whatever they could get their
hands on, and attacking residents and families in the neighborhood. The angry mob had hurried
there after clashing with workers on strike at one of the city’s largest factories, eager to punish
those who they believed were responsible for planning the strike and bringing radical ideas to
their Argentina.30 To such members of the Argentine elite and bourgeois class, supporters of then
President Hipólito Yrigoyen and the Argentine Radical Party, the large influx of Russian and
Eastern European immigrants in the city represented the arrival of “threatening” ideas like
communism, socialism, and anarchism. To them, only through the influence of these unwanted
immigrants could the 1919 workers’ strike be explained. Given that the majority of Russian
30

Victor A. Mirelman, “The Semana Trágica of 1919 and the Jews in Argentina,” Jewish Social Studies 37, no. 1
(1975): 62.
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immigrants to Buenos Aires were of Jewish origin, upper-class Argentines, some members of the
Church, and a number of officials in the Radical Party, argued that Jewish immigrants were
responsible for the strike and both communist and socialist opposition in the country.31
Motivated by these beliefs, police, soldiers, and upper-class Argentine men laid waste to Jewish
homes and stores, beating, raping, and killing other individuals they believed were Jewish or
Russian.32 This violence, which occurred over several days in early 1919, would come to be
known as the Semana Trágica (Tragic Week).
The Semana Trágica represented a watershed movement for the Jewish community and
antisemitism in Argentina. Its significance was clear to the many Jewish families living in
Buenos Aires who had fled Eastern Europe and especially Russia because of the wave of
pogroms that occurred there in the late 19th century.33 Argentina would not be the haven those
Jewish immigrants had imagined and hoped for, and the violence that resulted from the events of
the Semana Trágica demonstrated this.
The 1919 Semana Trágica also represented an instance in which the actors and
institutions involved and responsible for the pogrom had used the Jewish Question as a political
tool that could help shape Argentine society and identity. In 1919, discussions of the Jewish
community centered on the economic success of some Jewish immigrants, the spread of new
ideologies like socialism and communism in the country, and built on anti-immigrant sentiment.
These conversations surrounding the Jewish Question served to marginalize the Jewish
community and scapegoat it for the changes occurring in Argentine society at the time. In that
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sense, the antisemitism and the resulting violence of the Semana Trágica would represent a tool
that shaped Argentine society by maintaining the dominance of the urban upper-class, the
Catholic Church, and Radical Party within the country.
The economic success of some Jewish immigrants in Buenos Aires formed a significant
part of elite conversations around the Jewish Question in Argentina in the early 20th century.
Such economic success had resulted from the prominence of Jewish individuals in urban
commerce, with many community members working as peddlers or in houses of commerce.
These activities meant that a minority within the Jewish immigrant community had risen to the
urban middle and upper classes, which caused some discomfort to the traditional Argentine
upper class, mainly of Spanish descent and Catholic origin.34 Anti-immigrant sentiment had
grown in the country since the beginning of the 20th century, linked to an Argentine elite view of
Jewish and Southern European immigrants as inferior and lacking proper social mannerisms.35
The image of upper-class Argentines burning and looting Jewish businesses and homes was a
clear signal that such anti-immigrant sentiment had been redirected in this instance to the Jewish
community, and sent a message to economically successful Jewish families that they would be
unwelcome among the Argentine elite. This anti-immigrant sentiment had grown out of the
Hispanic upper class’s fear of displacement as economic and social leaders in Argentina, a
position that was hardly threatened by the success of some Jewish immigrants. Anxieties over the
changing ethnic makeup of the country contributed to such concerns, and the Jewish
community’s presence in Buenos Aires was at the center of such worries. Concerns over the
economic success of some Jewish immigrants thus sparked upper-class anti-Jewish violence
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during the Semana Trágica, and solidified the Hispanic elites’ position as the social and
economic driving force in Argentina.
Another important aspect of the Jewish Question in 1919 Argentina related to the growth
of communism, socialism, and anarchism in the country. The Catholic Church was one
institution alarmed over the growing power of communism, socialism, and anarchism globally,
and the potential influence those ideologies could have in Catholic countries.36 The Church in
Argentina similarly reacted to the presence of these ideologies in Argentina, with some priests
connecting their arrival in the country with the growing anti-immigrant, xenophobic sentiment
among the traditional urban elite. Such priests associated anarchism and socialism with Judaism,
thus spreading antisemitic propaganda through the city from pulpits and street corners.37 The
Church was closely aligned with the Argentine upper-class and oligarchy, and also worried about
losing their position as a leading institution in the country with the arrival of new immigrants and
new ideologies. An exaggerated association between Eastern European Jewish immigrants,
communism, and socialism, also served the Church in maintaining its dominance in Argentine
society.
The Radical Party government at the time also opposed communism and certain workers’
movements. President Hipólito Yrigoyen and the Radical Party (considered “radical” for its
advocacy for universal male suffrage in the late 19th century) had been elected in 1916 through
support from native-born Argentines, and sought to gain support among the Buenos Aires
working class. Yrigoyen, in fact, even expressed support for workers’ strikes led by political
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allies and native-born Argentines in this period.38 However, the 1918 workers’ strike that
resulted in the Semana Trágica was organized by anarchists, and occurred at a metallurgical firm
that employed many immigrants. Both of these groups represented sectors of society outside of
Yrigoyen and the Radical Party’s base, thus demonstrating why the government made no effort
to stop the mob that targeted workers and stormed through Jewish and other immigrant
neighborhoods.39 Socialism and anarchism were ideologies that competed for the support of the
urban working class in Argentina, and crushing an anarchist-led strike therefore allowed the
Radical Party to demonstrate its power and even control over the working class. In this way, the
government’s concerns over the rise of communism and uncontrolled immigration to Argentina
allowed the Radical Party to maintain and emphasize its position of power through the violence
of the Semana Trágica.
Anxieties over the position of the Jewish community in Argentina at this time focused on
the economic success of Jewish immigrants, the spread of communism and socialism in
Argentina, and concerns over immigration. The economic success and non-Hispanic ethnic
background of the Jewish community caused anxiety for the Argentine upper class, while some
priests in the Church explicitly linked Jewishness to communism and socialism because of the
Eastern European background of most Jewish immigrants. The Radical Party, meanwhile,
benefitted from violence that warned the working class against support for socialism and
anarchism, while building on anti-immigrant sentiment linked to newly arrived segments of the
Jewish community. The actions of these groups showed that the Jewish Question in Argentina
would be multifaceted and would have different definitions for distinct social groups, all
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stemming from a growing worry that the traditional bases of Argentine society were
disappearing. Nevertheless, upper-class elites, governmental actors, and the Catholic Church
would be the groups that would continue to frame and define the Jewish Question, as in this
period around the Semana Trágica, using it as a tool to shape Argentine society to their specific
designs.
Peronism, Secularism, and the Jewish Community
In early 1946, General Juan Perón won a democratic election over the Radical Civic
Union (Radical Party), whose support at the time largely came from the mostly liberal urban
middle class and opposed any form of military rule.40 Perón, who had been involved in the
military government that led the country from 1943 to 1946, therefore represented a threat to the
ideals that the Radical Civic Union stood for. For the Jewish community, much of which formed
part of the country’s urban middle class in the 1940s, Perón’s victory meant uncertainty, and the
rise of forces, such as the military and the Church, that had traditionally worked against the wellbeing of the community. Ideas like Catholic nationalism and Catholic-inspired forms of social
activism excluded the country’s Jews, and such ideas were largely popular among the base that
had elected Perón in 1946. Furthermore, Perón’s rhetoric, military past, and public image as a
strongman with a populist base led to fears among some in the Jewish community that he might
have fascist and even pro-Nazi tendencies. Perón did in fact admire some fascist leaders like
Mussolini in Italy and Franco in Spain, and during his time in power a number of Germans were
accepted into the country. In reality, Perón’s acceptance of such German immigrants was more
out of practical necessity rather than ideological affinity, as many of the German immigrants
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were engineers, scientists, and professionals who provided skill sets in short supply in
Argentina.41 Nevertheless, these factors combined led many in the Jewish community to be wary
of Perón’s position of power and the potential for antisemitism under such a regime.
Perón’s government and political ideology, despite his military past, represented a
rupture with traditional Argentine governments. Perón’s political base largely consisted of
working class Argentines, and in the early years of his presidency he would distance himself
from both the military and the Church, two institutions traditionally dominant in the country. He
would enact fairly progressive social policies when it came to workers’ rights, unions, and social
issues, further demonstrating his rejection of traditional Argentine politics and social
institutions.42 Perón also sought to include the Jewish community within his base, mobilizing on
elite concerns over the Jewish Question. The Jewish community to many in the upper-class and
Catholic Church leadership still represented a problem that threatened to displace their
dominance in the country and the Catholic nature of Argentina. Earning support among the
Jewish community allowed Perón to emphasize his separation from such social actors and
institutions. Their inclusion within his base emphasized the importance of secularism and loyalty
to him in this new Argentina. Fostering relations with the Jewish community also provided Perón
with the opportunity to improve his image abroad, specifically with the United States,
particularly given his reputation as an authoritarian leader with fascist and even pro-Nazi
leanings. His desire to include the Jewish community within his base and the resulting political
ideology associated with his regime, Peronism, reflected the view of the Jewish community as a
problem, as a non-Argentine, secularizing, and untrustworthy other living in the country. By

41

Some of the German immigrants who arrived in Argentina were former members of the Nazi party. See Rein,
Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines?, 78.
42
Romero and Brennan, A History of Argentina, 108.

19
including such a dangerous “other”, Perón forged a new political and social identity separate
from the conservative ones previously formed by the Church, upper-class, and military.
Perón’s efforts to earn support from the Jewish community consisted of a number of
tactics. First, Perón, unlike many previous Argentine presidents, directly addressed and met with
community leaders. Certain speeches addressed the importance of Jewish participation within
Peronism and the Argentine nature of the community, evident in the following comment he made
to Jewish Peronist activists in 1947: “My only wish is that all those who live here feel that they
are Argentines, that they are truly Argentine, independently of their origin or where they came
from”.43 Such inclusive language helped increase Jewish support for Perón, and contrasted with
the prevailing political and religious discourse surrounding the events of the Semana Trágica, in
which the Jewish community was highlighted as an enemy of the state and traditional Argentine
social institutions.
Perón’s gestures of goodwill to the community, like the admittance of 47 Jewish refugees
from Europe who had come to Argentina without papers after being denied entry to Brazil, also
led to increased affiliation with Peronism among Jewish individuals.44 This eventually fostered
the creation of a formal tie between the community and the Peronist government. In late 1947,
the OIA (Organización Israelita Argentina), a Jewish Peronist organization that advocated for
the social and political integration of Argentine Jews through Peronism, would form.45 The OIA,
at its founding, even stated that one of its goals would be to win over the Jewish vote for Perón.
Under Perón, the OIA also competed with the DAIA (Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas
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Argentinas), the traditional body of Jewish community leadership in Argentina, as the
representative of the Jewish community in the country.46 Perón’s efforts to include the Jewish
community within Peronism emphasized the secular nature of his state, showing that loyalty to
Argentina and Perón mattered far more in this period than ethnic or religious background. It also
allowed him to redefine Argentine nationalism and identity, even stating to the OIA in a meeting
that there was “only one class of men in Argentina...those who work for the national wellbeing.”47 Through comments like these, Perón was able to increase Jewish affiliation with
Peronism which in turn highlighted the new Peronist and anti-Peronist binary existent during his
time in power.
Perón’s inclusion of the Jewish community within Peronism clearly demonstrated his
rejection of traditional, conservative and Catholic ideologies. The alliance that often existed
between the Church and government, particularly military regimes, temporarily disappeared
during Perón’s stay in power. Jewish participation within Peronism was useful in demonstrating
the growing distance between Perón and the Church, primarily because of the presence of Jewish
individuals in important positions within the Peronist regime. These Jewish governmental figures
included economic advisor José Ber Gelbard and Rabbi Amram Blum who served as a religious
affairs advisor towards the end of Perón’s presidency.48 The appointment of Blum as a religious
affairs advisor communicated to the Church that Catholicism had lost its influence within the
Argentine government. The symbolism of photos of Perón and Blum together was clear, as it
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was an apparent rejection of the traditional Church-government alliance in the country. Blum’s
presence in Perón’s government further indicated the use inclusion of the Jewish community had
for Perón, in this case as a tool that effectively distanced him from the Catholic Church.
Discussions around combating and minimizing antisemitism were also a central part of
Perón’s relationship with the Jewish community. Such discussions were important for Perón,
given his damaged image abroad. Perón faced negative publicity for accepting former Nazis into
Argentina and was often associated with fascism in foreign press outlets.49 Because of these
factors, the United States in particular was wary of Perón and his authoritarian tendencies. The
United States had significant influence over Perón, because of his reliance on American capital
for industrialization and modernization projects domestically.50 Perón was therefore eager to
patch up American-Argentine relations immediately after taking power, and one of the primary
methods in improving such relations was attempting to prove to the American government that
antisemitism did not exist in Argentina. As a result, Perón and his wife Eva Perón’s (Evita)
public rhetoric occasionally addressed antisemitism specifically. Evita, in a 1948 speech, argued
that antisemitism in Argentina had been a consequence of previous governments’ actions and
that it was Perón who healed the country of the division such governments had fostered.51
The OIA, the Jewish Peronist organization operating in the country at the time, was
similarly helpful for Perón in his efforts to improve American-Argentine relations. The OIA,
given that it consisted of Jewish individuals, to the Americans represented a powerful and
seemingly credible source on antisemitism in Argentina. Perón recognized this, and likely
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benefited from the OIA’s visits with American leaders, including one in the late 1940s in which
several OIA members traveled to the United States to communicate to the American government
that antisemitism no longer existed in Argentina because of Perón’s efforts to combat it.52 These
proclamations from members of the Jewish community were particularly powerful given the
presence of former Nazis in Argentina at the time, and worked to better Perón’s reputation in the
United States. The OIA also played a role in establishing relations with Israel, with Argentina
officially recognizing the young state in 1949. Argentina would be the first Latin American
nation to send diplomatic representation to Tel Aviv, and for the remainder of Perón’s time in
power OIA members would serve as diplomatic intermediaries with Israel.53
Inclusion of the Jewish community within Peronism and voicing opposition to
antisemitism served Perón as political tools that helped shape Argentine society and identity
during his time in power. Increased political activity of members of the Jewish community
emphasized the secular nature of the Peronist state, and indicated a new sort of division within
Argentine society between Peronists and anti-Peronists, rather than between Catholics and nonCatholics. By appointing Jewish individuals to important positions in his government and
increasing ties with the community’s leadership as a whole, Perón indicated that a Peronist
Argentina would accept religious pluralism. Voicing opposition to antisemitism similarly helped
improve Argentina’s relations with the United States, demonstrating to the American
government that Perón could not have pro-Nazi or fascist tendences given his supposed
eradication of antisemitism.
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Perón’s inclusion of the Jewish community within Argentine politics built on the framing
of the Jewish Question in the period around the 1919 Semana Trágica. As elites and members of
the Catholic Church highlighted a Jewish problem that painted the Jewish community as a
secularizing, economically powerful other responsible for bringing threatening ideas like
communism and anarchism to Argentina, Perón looked for ways to demonstrate his rejection of
those same traditionally dominant social actors that defined the Jewish Question. By including
the Jewish community within Peronism, this dangerous non-Argentine other, Perón broke with
traditional Argentine politics and institutions. His legacy for the Jewish community is therefore
complex. On the one hand, his emphasis on secularism allowed many Jews to feel a position of
belonging previously unobtainable under mostly Catholic, conservative military regimes.54
Jewish figures participated in the Argentine government in important roles for the first time, and
a specifically Jewish political organization formed in support of the Peronist government.
On the other hand, his claims that antisemitism had been eradicated and was not tolerated
were simply untrue. Antisemitic elements within the Peronist base, for instance, were never
fully pushed out or addressed by Perón. The ALN (Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista) was one
such antisemitic group that supported Perón and had led a number of attacks against the Jewish
community before Perón’s election victory in 1946.55 Once he was in power, antisemitic
nationalists like those of the ALN were tolerated, although a few more extreme figures were
forced out of the ALN in the last couple years of Perón’s administration. This tolerance of
antisemitic nationalists who carried out frequent attacks on Jewish individuals allowed them to
gain agency, and in the ensuing decades some of these groups would even establish formal links

54
55

Marder, “The Organización Israelita Argentina,” 127.
Ibid. 126.

24
with Argentine governments. Ultimately, Perón’s efforts to demonstrate an opposition to
antisemitism would also serve future governments as a political tool useful in shaping Argentine
society and identity.
The 1950s and 1960s: Anti-Communism, Tacuara, and Antisemitism
In 1955, Juan Perón’s time as President came to an abrupt end when the Argentine
military staged a coup, forcing him into exile and later banning Peronism as a political ideology.
Partly as a result, the relative security the Jewish community had experienced under Perón would
disappear under the subsequent governments of the 1950s and 1960s. Antisemitic organizations
like the ALN (Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista) and Tacuara operated in this period largely
with impunity, accentuating certain views of the Jewish population as a problem threatening to
corrupt the traditional bases of Argentine society.56 In the 1950s, traditionally powerful
institutions like the military, Catholic Church, and upper-class elite returned to dominate
Argentine society, as they had during the period around the 1919 Semana Trágica. These
institutions reacted to and criticized Peronism’s rejection of the traditional, conservative values
of Argentina and emphasized Perón’s connection to the Jewish community as evidence of his
betrayal of these values, which to them determined Argentine identity.57
Some aspects of Perón’s governing style and political strategy would remain in the 1950s
and 1960s, despite the return to more traditional democratic and military governments. Like
Perón, these governments valued a strong alliance with the United States, a desire which at times
clashed with their views on the Jewish community and relationships with antisemitic
organizations like Tacuara. Actors like Tacuara, and some within the governments of the 1950s
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and 1960s, continued to highlight a Jewish Question in Argentina related to the Jewish
community’s political ideals and activity, influence as non-Catholics, and perceived status as
foreigners. Given the United States’ relationship with Israel and the importance of its own
Jewish community, American diplomats were generally eager to lessen the presence of
antisemitic organizations in Argentina. Like Perón, the democratic and military governments of
the 1950s and 1960s attempted to prove to the Americans that they were opposed to and had
even lessened antisemitism in Argentina. At the same time, these governments included and even
formed relationships with antisemitic organizations like Tacuara. This “balancing act” between
condemning antisemitism and including antisemitic groups within their political base allowed
such governments to improve relations with the United States, maintain democracy, and combat
communist influences within Argentine society. This section examines this “balancing act”
during the democratic government of Arturo Frondizi and the military government led by Juan
Carlos Onganía.
Frondizi took power in 1958, winning a democratic election after three years of military
rule. Despite the return to democracy, the influence of the military on Argentine politics
remained, as Frondizi faced strong pressure from them to not institute any radical changes
politically, economically, and socially.58 Because of this, sectors in Argentina ideologically
aligned with members of the military were largely untouchable for Frondizi. The antisemitic
nationalist organization Tacuara was an example of one such group with an ideological overlap
and strong connection to sectors of the military.59 Tacuara at times even received military
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training, and its members came mainly from the same Catholic, urban upper class background as
many military leaders. Tacuara was a fiercely anti-liberal, anti-communist, and antisemitic
organization, whose activities consisted of street fights against ideological opponents and
intimidation of Jewish merchants and individuals in general.60 Tacuara, however, also worked to
reduce the influence of Marxism in society, and many of their street fights consisted of clashes
with left-leaning groups active in the country.61 Not taking action against Tacuara’s activities and
attacks on Jewish merchants benefited Frondizi in two ways. First, Tacuara’s anti-communist
intimidation tactics helped his goal of reducing communist influences within Argentina. That is
not to say that Frondizi sponsored Tacuara and explicitly encouraged the organization to remove
leftist influences from society, but in refusing to act against and punish Tacuara for its attacks
and rhetoric, Frondizi essentially indicated to them that their actions were accepted and perhaps
even tacitly appreciated. Secondly, allowing Tacuara to operate largely with impunity signaled to
the military that Frondizi was not overly “problematic” or “radical”. Given the frequency of
military coups in this period of Argentine history, it is fair to say that appeasing the military was
almost a prerequisite for maintaining democracy. Frondizi thus chose to ignore, at least in his
legislation and policy, the many acts of antisemitism committed by Tacuara, seeking to ensure
the survival of democracy, his position of power, and the fight against communist influences in
Argentina.
Although Frondizi did not take legislative action against Tacuara and the antisemitic acts
they committed, he did at times condemn their activities and the group as a whole. Condemning
Tacuara at least gave Frondizi the appearance of an individual standing up to the extreme,
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nationalist, and antisemitic views present in the military and Argentine politics. This appearance
certainly would have helped in maintaining positive relations with the United States, who hoped
to count upon Frondizi as a reliable ally in the regional and global battle against communism.62
In this sense, Frondizi emulated Perón’s voiced opposition to antisemitism for diplomatic
purposes. Despite these condemnations, the freedom Tacuara had early in the Frondizi
administration would have disastrous consequences for the Jewish community, particularly after
Israeli Mossad agents captured Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires in 1960.
Eichmann had arrived in Argentina several years after the end of World War II with false papers,
and had remained in the country throughout the 1950s. Israel’s decision, upon receiving
intelligence that Eichmann was living in Buenos Aires, to move forward with his arrest without
consulting Argentine authorities also contributed to anti-Jewish sentiment in Argentina in the
years following the Eichmann capture.63 During those years, Tacuara’s antisemitic attacks and
rhetoric would increase, with one especially brutal incident occuring in 1962 when Tacuara
kidnapped and tortured a Jewish student, declaring the act as revenge for Eichmann’s capture.64
The murder a year later of a Jewish law student by Tacuara finally led to the banning of the
organization by the subsequent president Arturo Illia, although former members of the group
would continue similarly violent activities after this point.65
The balancing act between condemning antisemitism and allowing antisemitic groups to
continue to operate within Argentina continued into one of the following governments, the
military regime that took power in 1966. This new military regime, headed by General Juan
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Carlos Onganía, also had some connections to and ideological overlap with Tacuara, even
though its influence had decreased significantly in the mid-1960s since the ban enacted by the
Illia administration. Nevertheless, some disbanded members of the group became informants for
the Onganía regime, establishing a more explicit link between the antisemitic nationalism present
in Tacuara and the Argentine government.66 Tacuara’s connections with the military regime also
meant that an openly antisemitic organization could frame and define the Jewish Question along
with the Church, military, and Argentine upper-class. The balancing act for Onganía would
center on combating antisemitism while maintaining a relationship with disbanded members of
Tacuara responsible for antisemitic violence and rhetoric. This relationship between combating
antisemitism and incorporating Tacuara members into the regime allowed the military
government to remove communist influences from society and uphold a strong relationship with
the United States.
As for Frondizi, Tacuara members had political use in the anti-communist efforts and
campaigns the Onganía government led. The military figures in power believed that a new
liberal culture had led to the disappearance of traditional Argentine values linked to
Catholicism.67 Such military figures had strong connections with the Church leadership at the
time, which generally opposed reforms within the institution and the increasing numbers of
“Third World Priests” who tried to link Catholicism with a greater sense of social activism.68 The
military’s efforts to combat this liberal culture led to significant repression and censoring of
elements in society considered to be open to liberal and lefist ideals. For example, Onganía’s
government removed a number of left-leaning professors from prominent universities, banned
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political groups from campuses, and made it legal to arrest anyone linked to spreading,
harboring, or engaging with communist materials.69 Furthermore, the government, like Tacuara,
believed that the Catholic faith was central to national identity. Reducing communist influences
helped establish such a relationship between Catholicism and Argentine identity. The
incorporation of disbanded members of an antisemitic organization like Tacuara into the military
regime allowed the government to transform Argentina society and identity as it combated
communist influences.
Despite the presence of Tacuara members within the regime, Onganía assured both the
Jewish community and the American government that he and his regime would be accepting of
all religions.70 Like for Perón, combating antisemitism, or at least denying its existence, was a
central part of the balancing act for Onganía’s military regime and allowed him to improve
relations with the United States. In order to do so, Onganía had to both attempt to distance
himself from Tacuara and its antisemitic attacks without losing its support for his regime and aid
in the fight against communism. Meetings with American government officials and members of
the American Jewish community reflected this complex relationship the Onganía government
had with Tacuara and its members’ activities. In 1966, one such meeting occurred, when Morris
Abram, President of the American Jewish Committee, met in Buenos Aires with the Foreign
Minister of Onganía’s government, Nicanor Costa Méndez. During the meeting, Abram
expressed concern to Costa Méndez over the presence of antisemitism in Argentina, pointing out
that after taking power the government had invited both former Tacuara members and Jewish
community leaders to meet with Onganía.71 After insisting that the military government had
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greatly reduced the number of antisemitic incidents in Argentina since coming to power, Costa
Méndez stated that the meeting with Tacuara had simply been the result of a personal connection
between a high-ranking government official and a former member of Tacuara. When Abram
pressed Costa Méndez as to why the government had not specifically condemned Tacuara, his
response was that there was little use in singling them out, as it would bring unnecessary
attention to the group.72
The government’s refusal to individually condemn Tacuara and its actions reflected the
importance of the organization to the Onganía government. After all, Costa Méndez was an
advocate of a strong alliance with the United States, and was avidly anti-communist, which only
strengthened his desire to maintain positive relations with the Americans.73 Given this, his
refusal to oblige with American demands in this case, while also trying to highlight the regime’s
acceptance of religious diversity, is significant. It suggests that Tacuara still was of use to the
military in their anti-communist project, and that the regime would ignore the group’s antisemitic
nature while attempting to distance itself from such antisemitism. Furthermore, Costa Méndez’s
statement that a member of the military government had a personal connection in Tacuara hinted
at the continued link between the organization and the military. Such a connection, if it is
believed to be the actual reason behind the regime’s meeting with Tacuara, would hardly be
surprising, given the shared Catholic nationalist, anti-liberal backgrounds of both Tacuara and
the military. Through Costa Méndez’s interactions with Morris Abram, Onganía’s “balancing
act” is clear. On the one hand, like Perón and Frondizi, the military regime recognized the
importance of combating and distancing itself from antisemitism for the upkeep of positive
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foreign relations, primarily with the United States. On the other hand, they were unwilling to go
as far as removing antisemitic groups from society, because of personal and ideological
connections with such groups like Tacuara. Tacuara’s use in the Onganía government’s anticommunist repression also made the organization largely untouchable for the military regime,
making even more complex the balancing act managed by that government.
Tacuara’s incorporation into the military regime, however, also signified a development
within the framing and defining of the Jewish Question in Argentina. While traditionally
dominant social actors like the military, Church, and upper-class elite had originally responded
to a Jewish problem that they viewed as capable of removing their dominant position in society
and the Catholic values of Argentina, antisemitic organizations like Tacuara could now
participate in the response to this “problem”. In later military regimes similar to the Onganía
government, the Jewish Question would be conflated with a “Marxist Question”, which served as
a response to the growing influence of leftist and liberal thought in Argentina.74 The inclusion of
antisemitic organizations like Tacuara in military regimes contributed to this conflation and a
shift in the conception of the Jewish Question that more explicitly established a link between
Judaism and Marxism. Furthermore, as evident during the 1950s and 1960s under the Frondizi
and Onganía administrations, the Jewish Question would no longer exist in a vacuum within
Argentina, as the United States government pressured different governments to reduce
antisemitism.
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Conclusion
These three periods of Argentine history demonstrate the ways in which both responding
to the Jewish Question and tactically opposing antisemitism represented tools for different actors
to shape Argentine society and identity. The violence of the Semana Trágica of 1919 resulted in
part from distinct elements of the Jewish Question at the time. The growing economic success of
some Jewish immigrants, an exaggerated link between Eastern European immigrants and the
arrival of new ideologies like communism and socialism in Argentina, and elite concerns over
uncontrolled immigration from “undesirable” regions of the world were central to the Jewish
Question. Upper-class elites, in participating in the violence of the Semana Trágica, used it as a
tool that maintained their position as the economic and social driving force in Argentina, while
some members of the Catholic Church established a link between Judaism and communism,
scapegoating the Jewish community as a way of reducing communist influences in the country.
The Radical Party leadership similarly benefited from the Jewish Question and the repression of
working class immigrants who were outside of the party’s base.
The Peronist period of the 1940s and 1950s broke significantly with traditional Argentine
politics and social institutions. Peronism, in a way, defined itself in opposition to conservative,
traditionally dominant sectors of Argentina like the Catholic Church and upper-class elite. Given
that those same groups framed and defined the Jewish Question in the decades leading up to
Perón’s arrival in power, including the Jewish community within Peronist organizations and
within his own regime allowed Perón to distance himself from those same social actors he
rejected. Perón therefore capitalized on the Jewish Question, more specifically the idea of the
Jewish community as a force that threatened to corrupt the traditional bases of Argentine society
and identity, to form a new Peronist identity in opposition to conservative, elite conceptions of
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Argentina. Inclusion of the Jewish community within Peronism, this secularizing, non-Catholic,
“dangerous” other within Argentina, highlighted the secular nature of Perón’s state and that
loyalty to the regime defined Argentine identity, instead of Catholicism or any other
distinguishing feature. Nevertheless, after the end of World War II, with the victory of the Allied
powers and the creation of Israel in 1948, the Jewish Question in Argentina could no longer exist
separate from conservations around Jewish communities and antisemitism in the rest of the
world. Perón recognized this and attempted to prove to the United States that he had eradicated
antisemitism in Argentina, despite the presence of some antisemitic nationalist organizations like
the ALN (Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista) within his political base. The following
governments of Arturo Frondizi and Juan Carlos Onganía would also attempt to prove that they
were combating antisemitism in order to maintain positive relations with the United States.
Both Frondizi and Onganía had to adopt a balancing act between condemning
antisemitism and maintaining the support of antisemitic nationalist organizations like Tacuara.
Tacuara served both regimes as they sought to combat communist influences in Argentina, and
in the case of the military government of General Onganía, former Tacuara members even
formed part of the regime’s repressive apparatus. Frondizi and Onganía, however, attempted to
distance themselves from the antisemitic attacks and rhetoric of Tacuara, particularly when
meeting with American officials. Both regimes' refusal to definitively act against Tacuara
allowed its influence on society and traditionally dominant social actors like the military to grow.
Even though the Jewish Question could no longer exist in an Argentine vacuum, the impunity
guaranteed for Tacuara and other far-right actors provided them the opportunity to re-emphasize
the Jewish “problem”, a reality evident during the following military dictatorship in the late
1970s, explored in the next chapter.
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While these distinct periods of 20th century Argentine history differed in relation to the
Jewish Question and antisemitism, they all reflected a social reality in which Jews were
considered to be foreign. If these regimes had viewed the Jewish community as truly and fully
Argentine, it is hard to imagine they would have allowed antisemitic organizations to continue to
operate with impunity or would have even purposefully used Jewish individuals as diplomatic
intermediaries abroad. The framing of the Jewish Question by the military, Church, and upperclass elite during the Semana Trágica othered the Jewish community as a secularizing, nonCatholic, economically powerful, and politically radical force that threatened to do away with
Argentine tradition and the link between national identity and Catholicism. This began the
process of othering the Jewish community, a reality that future regimes responded to, altered, but
never fully rejected. Even the supposedly inclusive government of Juan Perón singled out Jews
as an other, painting them as such to highlight his eventual inclusion of the community within
Peronism. Argentina’s Jews, in the eyes of these respective governments, social classes, and
nationalist organizations, were foreigners, second-class citizens, and were never quite worth full
protection. The consequences of this reality, as the following two chapters will show, would be
clear in later periods as antisemitism continued to marginalize Argentina’s Jews and would even
become a part of efforts to foster national unity and identity in the 1980s.
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Chapter 2: Cabildo and Antisemitism in the Argentine Military (1976-1983)
In 1979, the Argentine Federal District Court fined both the director and editor of the
right-wing, antisemitic magazine Cabildo, charging them for “slander” and “abuse” directed at
Moises Kostzer, a wealthy Jewish businessman. A particularly scathing letter to the editor had
accused Kostzer of being a “Marxist theorist” and an “economic subversive”, accusations that if
true would render him an enemy of the firmly anticommunist military regime in power at the
time.75 Cabildo, and antisemitic opinion and thought more generally, rarely faced any sort of
pushback from the military state. Indeed, as during previous Argentine governments, many
international observers believed that the state itself was supportive of antisemitic views and Nazi
ideologies.76 Given this, the government’s response to this specific instance of antisemitism is
notable. However, this was not the only time military leaders opposed or sought to counter
antisemitism. Faced with significant international pressure, particularly from the United States,
to curb antisemitism and respect human rights, more “moderate” military leaders did
occasionally respond through legal or political action.
The writers of Cabildo, in the same editions that contained antisemitic rhetoric,
frequently attacked such leaders, like President Jorge Videla, for showing “weakness” in bowing
to international pressure. Their criticism, and the responses military leaders took to Cabildo’s
rhetoric, reveal the deep divisions within the military regime that ruled Argentina from 1976 to
1983. Various factions and individuals within the military supported the views expressed within
Cabildo. The memoirs of Jewish political prisoners like journalist Jacobo Timerman, for
example, show that the antisemitic, pro-Nazi beliefs apparent in Cabildo flourished in the
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military’s many detention centers. On the other hand, Cabildo’s obvious antisemitism provided
President Videla, like Perón and Onganía before him, the opportunity to tactically oppose
antisemitism, enhancing his own position within the military regime and receiving international
support for it. This chapter will use Cabildo to examine the internal tension and power struggle
between “moderates” and ultra-nationalist extremists within the military, analyzing both the
magazine’s ideological and personal connections to such extremist military sectors as well as the
government response to the magazine’s antisemitic rhetoric.
Antisemitism and Military Rule (1976-1983)
One of the most controversial legacies of the military regime that led Argentina from
1976 to 1983 is its relation to antisemitism. This antisemitism built on the inclusion of far-right
groups like Tacuara in previous military governments and the voice those groups gained in not
facing repression from the governments described in Chapter 1. Under the military regime that
took power in 1976, many of the forces that had defined and framed the Jewish Question in the
early 1900s remained dominant in the country. These forces, like the military, Church, and
upper-class elite, in large part still viewed the Jewish Question as a “problem”, given the Jewish
community’s status as non-Catholics, political activity, economic success, and relatively secular
nature. Even more so than during the Semana Trágica and under the Onganía regime, antisemitic
voices influenced the ruling government and increasingly conflated fears over the spread of
Marxism and liberal thought in Argentina with anxieties over the Jewish Question. Some figures
who contributed to this growing overlap between the Marxist Question and the Jewish Question
even held high positions within the military government. Additionally, most of the generals of
the three branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) originated from Argentina’s
urban middle class and were almost entirely of Italian and Spanish backgrounds. Given that the
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vast majority of them belonged to the Catholic faith, the military’s leaders did not reflect the
diversity of the country and often rejected and looked down upon religious and ethnic minorities
in the country.77 Many military leaders also believed, like previous military figures in the 20th
century, that Catholicism was central to Argentine identity, a view which left Jews as a nonArgentine other residing in the country.
The conflation of the Marxist Question and the Jewish Question contributed to the human
rights violations many Jewish individuals experienced during military rule in the 1970s and
1980s. Although the Jewish community in Argentina comprised roughly 1% of the country’s
population at the time of the 1976 coup, Jewish individuals made up around 10% of the
desaparecidos (“disappeared”) under the military regime.78 Many abroad presumed that, given
that Argentina contained the largest Jewish community in Latin America and served as a postwar haven for a number of Nazis, the military regime imprisoned, tortured, and killed Jews
simply for being Jewish.79 Scholars writing after the dictatorship, however, have refuted this,
noting that the relatively large proportion of Jewish political prisoners and desaparecidos was a
result of the high percentage of Jewish university students, activists, and professionals. The
military did in fact target professions like psychiatry, journalism, and law as possible sites of
subversion, and a significant number of Argentine Jews happened to work in these sectors.80
Although this explanation for the high proportion of Jewish individuals among the regime’s
political prisoners is generally accepted, it is unquestionable that antisemitism did occur at the
hands of the military. While there is little evidence that Jewish individuals faced arrest simply for
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being Jewish, once arrested Jews received far harsher treatment than their non-Jewish
counterparts.81 The memoirs of individuals like imprisoned Jewish journalist Jacobo Timerman,
explored later in the chapter, or the archives of activists such as American rabbi Marshall Meyer
attest to this.
The Creation and Rise of Cabildo
With its first edition published in 1973, Cabildo was a relatively new magazine in 1976
when the military took control. Cabildo had been fairly active during the years preceding the
coup, and opposed many of the developments occurring in the country in those years.82 After
several years under military rule, Argentina had returned to democracy in 1973. The return to
democracy also marked the reappearance of Juan Perón from exile. Although Perón died less
than a year after his return to Argentina, Peronist politicians dominated the country’s government
in the remaining two years before the 1976 coup. Both the military and Cabildo viewed the
return of Perón as the beginning of Argentina’s deterioration in those years, as the country
became increasingly prone to often violent political attacks.83 Naturally, the editors and writers
of Cabildo expressed openly antidemocratic views and regularly criticized the Peronist
government in their publications. Because of this, the Peronist government headed by Juan
Perón’s second wife Isabel Perón censored three separate editions of the magazine. In a Peronist
Argentina, there was clearly no place for Cabildo’s views.
The return of military rule in 1976 would change Cabildo’s status from a sidelined,
censored magazine to one whose views were largely accepted. The editors of the magazine
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believed that they would take an active part in the “Process of National Reorganization” begun
by the military.84 In the early years of the military dictatorship, Cabildo regularly praised the
national project the government had undertaken. Although they would eventually come to
criticize some members and actions of that same government, during the military dictatorship the
magazine flourished and reached a level of national (and international) attention not realized in a
democratic Argentina.
Cabildo, Extremism, and the Military
In 1977, in a regular human rights report on Argentina, the American embassy in Buenos
Aires reported to the Secretary of State in Washington that “nationalistic elements” in the
military regularly consumed Cabildo.85 Only a year into military rule, the United States
government was already aware of the presence of Cabildo, and that a largely ideological link
seemed to exist between Cabildo, the ideas expressed within it, and the military. Although the
magazine mostly received funding from rightwing business interests, and there is little evidence
that the military regime itself directly supported Cabildo financially, the magazine did serve as a
voice for extremist and ultra-nationalist factions within the military, and the country as a whole.
It surely caught the attention of the United States government given both its presumed
connection with sectors of the military and the problematic views expressed within it. Even if the
military regime did not view Cabildo as a tool of the state, some prominent military leaders did
in fact contribute to the magazine. In the years leading up to the 1976 coup, Ramón J. Camps,
head of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police during the dictatorship, contributed to and regularly
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read Cabildo.86 Even Cabildo itself, in a later edition, noted that it had “a wide dissemination
among the military ranks”.87 Furthermore, Cabildo would remain throughout military rule,
despite the regular attacks it directed at President Jorge Videla and other “moderates”. The views
and commentary expressed within it rarely faced pushback from Videla and other military
leaders, suggesting the influence and the importance the magazine had for other prominent, more
extremist military members. After all, Videla and other prominent generals tended not to accept
any form of criticism towards the regime, making this lack of censorship even more notable. It
also further indicates a division within the military regime, and the power of extremist generals
like Ramón J. Camps in that same regime.88
Two specific cases demonstrate Cabildo’s ideological connection to the extremist wing
of the military. In both these cases, Cabildo responded in their writing to the controversies
surrounding the military’s arrest of prominent Jewish individuals and families. Their beliefs
reflected the actions and the rhetoric of certain leaders and sectors of the military, yet clashed
with international pressure and opinion on these cases. As a later section will show, their beliefs
and rhetoric would clash with that of other sectors of the military government too. The first of
these cases is that of the Graiver family, and the accusations of money laundering directed at that
family and their business.
Throughout the dictatorship, the military regime remained convinced that Marxist
subversion existed in all spaces of society, threatening to corrupt the traditional bases of
Argentina, like the Jewish “problem”. These spaces included universities, literary societies, and
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even prominent businesses.89 There is little surprise, therefore, that the military suspected Jewish
businessman David Graiver of laundering money to armed Marxist revolutionaries, like the
group Montoneros active in the country at the time. The uncertainty surrounding Graiver’s death
in a freak plane accident in Mexico in 1976 served to add more credence to the military’s
suspicions, and in 1977 the military would move forward and arrest Graiver’s wife and family.
Five years later, a federal judge ruled that the Graiver family was completely innocent, and that
their only crime was their relation to the deceased David Graiver, who was only presumed
guilty.90 Regardless of their innocence, Cabildo and certain factions of the military remained
convinced that the Graiver family as a whole was guilty, even before the whole scandal arose.
Writing in October of 1976, only a couple months after David Graiver had passed,
Cabildo wasted no words in expressing their view on the Jewish businessman. To them, Graiver
was no more than a “Polish Jew who figured out how to make a large fortune among us” and
who “expanded his public figure...up to national clandestine politics and the highest levels of the
Argentine state”.91 Interestingly, this edition of Cabildo came out several months before the
accusations of money laundering appeared. To Cabildo, before Graiver was even considered
guilty, he was already one who could not be trusted and represented a threat to Argentine society.
The antisemitism in Cabildo’s writing on Graiver is clear. The writers of Cabildo do not see him
as Argentine, and their underlying argument is that Graiver was no more than a thief who
through his money came to have an influence on Argentine power structures. The writers of
Cabildo believed that Catholicism was the central characteristic of the Argentine nation, and that
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religious minorities largely had no place in such a nation. In their writing, Jewish individuals
were regularly stripped of their Argentine identities, as Graiver was here. This was hardly
different from the language the military regime used in its own discourse. While generally not
directed against the country’s Jews, that same discourse identified Marxist and leftist Argentines
as the country’s enemies. The military argued that as enemies of the nation such individuals and
organizations could no longer be considered Argentine.92 That is not to say that Cabildo
influenced the military leaders’ public discourse, but there certainly was overlap in the way both
talked about the country’s enemies, whether Jewish, Marxist, or something different altogether.
In 1977, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, headed by former Cabildo contributor
Ramón J. Camps, moved forward to arrest David Graiver’s wife.93 Camps was a particularly
powerful figure at the time, given that the police formed part of the regime’s security forces and
repressive apparatus, and that Buenos Aires Province contained roughly a third of the country’s
population at the time.94 Camps, and extremist sections of the military, shared in Cabildo’s view
of the Graiver family and their supposed guilt. Camps himself had even published a book that
intended to prove David Graiver’s connections with the armed Marxist group Montoneros.95
Cabildo, like Camps, had used the accusations of the Graiver family’s money laundering as
proof of some sort of “Jewish-Marxist-Montonero” apparatus plotting to take control of
Argentina.96 This view reflected the conflation of Judaism and Marxism present during the
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Semana Trágica and strengthened by the presence of antisemitic organizations like Tacuara
within military governments. It went a step further than other views linked to the Jewish
Question, however, highlighting the Jewish community not only as a force that threatened
traditional Argentine values but that even hoped to take control of the country. Camps and some
contributors to Cabildo, along with other Argentine far-right nationalists, pushed forward a belief
that international Jewish interests were in the process of forming some sort of Jewish enclave or
state in Patagonia. These same nationalists, much like those of Nazi Germany, argued that
Argentina and the world’s ills were the result of Jewish power.97 This shared antisemitic
ideological belief between members of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police and Cabildo indicate
an influence and connection between each group. While it is impossible to prove that Cabildo
sparked the whole Graiver affair, Cabildo’s rhetoric and link to Ramón Camps, who was so
prominent in the Graiver family’s arrest, does demonstrate the magazine’s role as a voice for the
extremist factions within the military.
The Graiver affair was not the only instance in which a prominent Argentine Jew had to
confront and experience the antisemitism within both the military and Cabildo. The arrest of
journalist Jaboco Timerman in 1977 would further reveal both the internal tension in the military
as well as the ideological viewpoints of Cabildo’s writers and military extremists. The cause for
Timerman’s arrest remains unclear, with members of the military claiming he, like Graiver,
supported Montoneros, and therefore was a Marxist subversive. Evidence for this did not exist,
and many international observers would claim that Timerman’s arrest was the result of
antisemitism.98 Timerman, before his arrest, was the editor of Argentine journal La Opinión and
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had supported the military coup in 1976 as a solution to the country’s violent political
divisions.99 Given those views, it is hard to imagine Timerman as some sort of Marxist
subversive.
Timerman was, however, a self-proclaimed Zionist, an identity that alarmed some in the
military and the writers of Cabildo.100 Timerman’s openness about Zionism, which to him
represented support for the state of Israel and Jewish nationalism, may have been the cause of his
arrest, as some in the military ignorantly viewed Zionism as a form of communism.101 To farright nationalists concerned about Jewish loyalty to Argentina, his status as a Zionist confirmed
some of their suspicions about the Jewish community, as to them it was an example of the
“foreign” and even subversive nature of the community. To such figures, it served as proof that
Jews were untrustworthy and had a dual allegiance, or simply that they were connected with
foreign interests. This idea appeared in some of the interrogations Timerman endured while in
one of the military’s prisons. For example, one interrogator told him, as if it were fact, that Israel
“has created three power centers abroad….one is the United States, where Jewish power is
evident…the second is the Kremlin, where Israel also has important influence…and the third
center of power is Argentina”.102 Timerman notes that denial of such a plan for Jewish control of
Argentina (specifically Patagonia), known as El Plan Andinia, only caused the military
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individuals he met to believe even more strongly in said conspiracy.103 His status as a Zionist
would have caused such antisemitic individuals in the military to link that identity with the idea
of international Jewish power and supposed efforts to undermine Argentine sovereignty. The
influence of such antisemitic ideologies and conspiracies on the military regime was clear,
particularly when the Argentine Minister of the Interior admitted to the United States’ Carter
administration in a meeting that Timerman was imprisoned for being a Zionist. Significant
international pressure from the United States would eventually result in Timerman’s release and
exile in Israel, though some in the military remained convinced of his guilt and continued to see
Zionism as a crime.
Cabildo was naturally one such voice that remained confident of Timerman’s guilt. In
1978, when the military regime decided to move him from one of the detention centers to house
arrest, Cabildo responded with a number of scathing attacks on the Jewish journalist. To
Cabildo, Timerman’s own identity already served as his confession: “Jewish, but a Zionist,
Zionist, but of the left, according to his own public confession, spewed out his hate, ambition,
and irreverence upon the very roots of the nation that so unscrupulously had taken him in”.104
Timerman’s status as a Zionist, which of course he admitted to publicly, supported Cabildo’s
belief that Jews were untustwory and connected to foreign interests. The Argentine nation,
according to Cabildo, had made the mistake of letting such a dangerous figure into the country.
Just as upper-class elites, the Church, and government officials blamed the arrival of
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communism and anarchism in Argentina on Jewish immigrants during the Semana Trágica,
Cabildo suggested that Argentina had allowed such ideologies to gain ground by accepting yet
another Jewish immigrant. Timerman had immigrated to Argentina as a child from the Soviet
Union, further alarming those suspicious of his loyalty to Argentina, as the Soviet Union
represented the home of communism and an important foreign power. Cabildo therefore shared
in the belief that the Ministry of the Interior and Ramón Camps held of Zionism and the
trustworthiness of Jewish individuals, yet another instance of the ideological overlap between the
military and Cabildo. Once again, Cabildo seemed to be the voice of the military extremists,
although in this case such extremists even felt comfortable voicing their opinion in a meeting
with the Carter administration.
Cabildo’s ideological overlap with the military is evident in Timerman’s memoir,
Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number, in which he describes the antisemitic treatment
he encountered while in one of the military’s prisons. Timerman’s guards and interrogators often
tortured him severely, and seemed to enjoy doing it. In his memoir, he recalls how soldiers
would chant “Jew” while torturing him, or how he heard one woman screaming that she was
Catholic while several soldiers mocked her as a Jew during interrogation.105 Another Jewish
prisoner of the military recalled that a priest had encouraged him to convert to Catholicism, so as
to avoid the harsher interrogations and torture Jewish prisoners faced. Other prisoners even
stated that soldiers would ask newly arrived detainees if they were Jewish or not, which later
determined the treatment such prisoners would receive.106 It is clear from Timerman and other
prisoners’ accounts that simply being Catholic allowed for some acceptance as Argentine. On the
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other hand, being Jewish meant suspicion, and treatment as both an enemy of the state and an
enemy of the nation. The construction of a Jewish other, too, seemed to be an approach within
military detention centers, even as a way of forming a shared identity in opposition to the Jewish
prisoners soldiers interacted with. This othering reflected the Jewish Question, the idea that the
Jewish community threatened traditional Argentine values, national identity, and society as a
whole.
Cabildo, as a voice for extremist viewpoints, demonstrated its ideological common
ground with factions of the military throughout the Graiver and Timerman affairs, as well as the
military dictatorship as a whole. Their ideologies were antisemitic, and often based on
falsehoods that fabricated evidence of anti-Argentine threats and conspiracies. For the military,
in addition to representing actual beliefs and convictions, such ideologies served as a way of
accessing power. In 1979, those very same ideologies resulted in a revolt in the interior city of
Córdoba, when Third Army corps commander Luciano Benjamin Menéndez marched his troops
against the military government which had decided to release Timerman.107 Although
Menéndez’s coup would fail, it demonstrated how prevalent antisemitic conspiracies were
among some factions of the military, and how those beliefs could be mobilized to access power.
After all, the military regime could only really justify its stay in power if a serious threat existed
to the country’s security. Having essentially eradicated armed leftist groups like Montoneros, the
military needed to demonstrate that there was some other threat to the Argentine nation. To
Cabildo and pro-Nazi extremists in the military this was the world’s, and Argentina’s, Jews.
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Military Moderates? The Response to Cabildo and Antisemitism
In early 1978, Navy commander Emilio Massera reportedly approached the Carter
administration in the United States, promising that if he were in power (instead of President
Jorge Videla), he would be committed to halting all human rights violations. Human rights
activists from Argentina, however, reported that Massera had never shown any more devotion to
human rights causes than Videla and that in fact the Navy had committed some of the gravest
human rights violations in that period.108 Massera himself probably cared little about human
rights, but it was a language, an idea through which he could access power. For some in the
military government, including President Videla, antisemitism served the same purpose as
human rights discourse. Tactically opposing it allowed him and other moderates to enhance their
own position within the military regime, and, similarly to Perón and Onganía, improve
international relations. In a ruling body rife with division, as shown by Menéndez’s failed coup
in Córdoba or Massera’s appeal to the Carter administration, distancing oneself from other
sectors in the regime proved to be useful. As this section will show, there were a number of
instances in which Videla and military “moderates” opposed Cabildo, extremist voices, and
antisemitism in an effort to maintain their loose grip on power.
Cabildo was often critical of Videla, and seemed to view him as overly weak. Given that
Cabildo believed there were a host of enemies of the Argentine nation, to them it seemed that
Videla was simply allowing those enemies to operate with impunity. Cabildo’s commentary on
the government’s decision to transfer Jacobo Timerman from imprisonment in one of the
military’s detention centers to house arrest demonstrates this: “the state is subjectively weak.
Particularly, in regards to foreign pressure. Only thus can one explain the astonishing privilege 108
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under the label of ‘house arrest’, but as a pledge for his definitive freedom in the short run - (the
state) has just granted to Jacobo Timerman.”109 Only the government’s perceived weakness
could explain this “privilege” the state had granted Timerman in placing him under house arrest .
Of course, Cabildo was correct in identifying international pressures behind the Timerman case,
given that the Carter administration in the United States demanded frequent updates on his wellbeing and status during his imprisonment. Videla received the confidence of American diplomats
in Argentina and was generally receptive to American demands.110 His relationship with the
United States and Cabildo, as the voice of military extremists, provide more explanation for his
actions throughout his time in power.
It was easy for Videla to distance himself from extremism and antisemitism given his
relationship with Cabildo. In the same article, the magazine’s writers would denounce Jewish
power and Videla’s own weakness, as they did in an August 1977 edition: “Cabildo goes back to
remaining between two fires: the government which has fined it and Jewish power”.111 To the
international observer, surely, then, Videla himself could not have supported Cabildo’s views
and antisemitic beliefs. He too was a victim of their often scathing editorials. Even if he might
have opposed antisemitism from a moral standpoint, curbing antisemitic voices clearly served
him tactically as well. Videla’s government took advantage of this, censoring overly antisemitic
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editions of Cabildo twice.112 In doing so, Videla and the government could position itself as
moderate and in opposition to the antisemitism expressed in Cabildo.
In another instance, Videla attempted to censor Cabildo yet again, though not explicitly
for antisemitism. According to a human rights report from the American embassy in Buenos
Aires, in March 1978 “the government was contemplating action against the extreme right wing
magazine Cabildo for a scathing editorial attacking President Videla’s proposed racial and
religious anti-discrimination law (which has been shelved). However, nothing seems to have
developed.”113 There are a number of important elements to note here. First, the fact that Videla
had proposed a racial and religious anti-discrimination law is significant. It suggests that Videla
was either responding to international pressure to put forward such a law, or believed it would be
useful to push for it himself. Regardless, to the United States, Videla appeared as a moderate for
proposing such a law, and that only would have further established his position as the United
States’ chief ally within the military regime. Secondly, Cabildo’s response to the proposition of
such a law further distanced Videla from extremist, antisemitic factions within Argentina. It
exposed a tension between these antisemitic factions and moderates within the government.
Finally, this tension is even more apparent in the outcome of this whole situation described by
the American embassy. The law did not pass, which reflects the influence of more hardline
nationalist factions in the military government, and Cabildo was not censored. In a regime that
generally censored any form of press that criticized it, save perhaps the more international
Buenos Aires Herald, it is interesting that Cabildo, even with its own criticism, remained active
throughout military rule.114 Again, this implies some sort of support among the military for the
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ideas expressed within Cabildo, and indicates that Videla and other moderates did not have
sufficient control to silence extremist voices. As one US-based journal noted at the time, “Videla
reigns but does not rule”.115 Through actions like pushing forward an anti-religious
discrimination law, or censoring antisemitic voices, however, Videla and other moderates could
improve their own standing and power by improving relations with the United States, just as
other Argentine leaders did before him.
Jacobo Timerman’s memoir provides further insight into this response to antisemitism
and extremism by some military leaders. Throughout his memoir, Timerman makes a distinction
between military moderates and extremists, arguing that it was the extremists who arrested,
interrogated, and tortured him. Interestingly, the figure of Ramón Camps, the same general
involved with Cabildo and the Graiver affair, appears as villain again in Timerman’s own history
while he is under the custody of the Federal Police. Timerman contrasts Camps with the socalled moderates, who acted upon his behalf: “from the outset, President Rafael Videla and
General Roberto Viola tried to convert my disappearance into an arrest in order to save my
life”.116 Had Timerman remained “disappeared”, in reality kidnapped and detained illegally like
countless Argentines, it is likely he would have died, cast into the River Plate or shot and piled
into a mass grave. Timerman almost goes as far to suggest that military leaders like Videla did
not originally know about the plot to detain him, and thus worked to counter it once other
military factions apprehended him. Just as with the response to and censorship of Cabildo, it is
unknown if Videla and General Viola attempted to save Timerman for moral and ideological
reasons, or rather for diplomacy and their own personal gain. Regardless, it still allowed them to
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position themselves as moderates and maintain their hold on power, even if they were not
necessarily moderates ideologically. Timerman’s own release from custody and exile in Israel
were the result of Videla’s actions, as the military only agreed to obey the Supreme Court’s
demand for his release when Videla threatened to quit.117 Videla’s response to antisemitism and
extremism, once again, only served to improve his international image.
The internal division within the military would remain throughout the entirety of their
stay in power. Videla would ultimately step down in 1981 as a result of such tensions, and his
successor Roberto Viola would face the same fate shortly afterwards. Videla’s leadership was
complicated, as is his legacy. To many, he remains a representation of the brutality of the
military regime, as it was he who presided over a ruling body that assassinated over 30,000
Argentines. Videla was largely unable, or perhaps unwilling, to rein in extremists in the military,
although his censoring of Cabildo and diplomatic engagement with the United States reveal that
he made some effort to contain them. Most sources from outside Argentina at the time describe
Videla as a conservative, or as a nationalist, but not as a fascist. Some American and Argentine
Jewish leaders even argued that Videla would “move against antisemitism if he could”, but that
he did not have the power or resources to do so.118 Videla’s seemingly positive international
image, however, was a result of his actions and self-depiction as a moderate. He could distance
himself from the antisemitism that ran through the military and its prisons, or that featured so
prominently in magazines like Cabildo. Ultimately, it is unclear how successful this tactic was.
Cabildo continued to operate throughout military rule, and Videla did not remain in power.
Nevertheless, perhaps the fact that he managed to lead such a divided military for five years was
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a result of his political strategy and expertise, which included tactical opposition to certain
instances of antisemitism.
Conclusion
The Argentine Federal Court’s 1979 decision to charge Cabildo’s editor and director for
“slander” through the “medium of the press” represents one of the few instances in which the
military government actually countered antisemitism in an effective manner.119 Facing regular
accusations of antisemitism throughout its time in power, the military continued to insist it was
not antisemitic and that Argentina’s Jews were completely safe under military rule.120 Cabildo
itself responded to charges of antisemitism, stating that as devout Catholics, they could not be
antisemitic: “How can we, who worship a God who is Jewish in the flesh, be racist?”121
Nevertheless, Cabildo’s own rhetoric throughout the military dictatorship would suggest
otherwise, as would the military’s actions. Argentina’s Jews were safe under military rule as long
as they were not doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, businessmen, rabbis, activists, students, or
soldiers. Antisemitic generals like Ramón Camps filled important positions within the military
regime, and could openly express their views without any form of accountability. There was no
large scale effort to eradicate antisemitism within the military’s detention centers, as those who
controlled those spaces of repression were often antisemitic themselves, like Third Army Corps
commander Luciano Menéndez.122 This is what made actions against antisemitism by President
Videla and other “moderates” so notable. These actions were rare, yet were highly strategic. By
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censoring Cabildo, particularly after various international groups criticized it severely, or by
proposing an anti-religious discimination law, Videla styled himself as a moderate. In such a
divided military, each general needed their own strategy and method to maintain or increase their
own authority. For Navy commander Emilio Massera, this strategy consisted of appealing to
American human rights discourse. For President Jorge Videla and General Roberto Viola, this
strategy consisted of opposing high profile instances of antisemitism, as in the case of Jacobo
Timerman. For others, like Ramón J. Camps and Luciano Menéndez, the fabrication of internal
and external enemies, all related to the Jewish faith, represented a clear strategy to enhance their
own positions, building on their own antisemitic convictions. Both these military men styled
themselves as nationalists operating in the face of grave threats to the country’s hegemony, and
both antisemitism and Cabildo provided the means to do so.
This period, similarly, demonstrated how the Jewish community in Argentina remained
an other within Argentina. During the military dictatorship, the actors who framed the Jewish
Question as a Jewish “problem” in the early 20th century remained dominant in Argentina.
These actors, like the military, Church, and upper-class elite, still viewed the Jewish community
as a force that threatened the traditional, Catholic nature of Argentine society and identity. Their
framing of the Jewish Question and rhetoric expressed in magazines like Cabildo continued to
other Jews as a secularizing, political radical, and economically powerful threat. However, this
othering had become even more present within the military government as antisemitic figures
gained power within the regime, highlighting the Jewish community as a “foreign” threat linked
to an international Jewish plot for world domination. In the military’s prisons and detention
centers, this othering of Jews was clear, and seemed to be part of the process of forming an
Argentine national identity linked to Catholicism. Military leaders would continue to speak of
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the importance of Catholicism in shaping Argentine society throughout the dictatorship, and
antisemitism would continue to have a central role in this attempt to hone a specific national
identity and character. This would be especially evident later on in military rule when Argentina
invaded the nearby Malvinas Islands, and Jewish individuals were able to participate largely for
the first time within the military and Argentine nationalism.
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Chapter 3: The Malvinas War: Unity for Some, Exclusion for Others
In May of 1982, as British ships and planes continued to approach the Malvinas Islands,
the Argentine military quickly organized itself to prepare for the defense of the islands they had
taken for themselves only a month earlier.123 As soldiers piled into the military’s planes and
prepared to make the short journey over the South Atlantic from Patagonia to the Malvinas
Islands, a lieutenant pulled one of his soldiers aside, telling him he would not be fighting at the
front: “I’m only taking criollo soldiers, not a Jew”.124 Marcelo Eddi, the young Jewish conscript
the lieutenant was speaking to, boarded the plane anyway when the lieutenant’s focus had shifted
elsewhere, eager to prove his own sense of patriotism to his superiors. The lieutenant’s comment
reflected a larger truth about the Malvinas War and the reality within the Argentine military
during the conflict. Through antisemitic and Catholic nationalist discourse, the military excluded
and marginalized Jewish conscripts and individuals. This exclusion was a central part of a
military-led ideological project to foster Argentine unity linked to a Catholic identity,
representing a continuation of the othering of the Jewish community as a secularizing, politically
radical, and “foreign” threat to the Argentine nation. The experience of Jewish individuals like
Marcelo Eddi during the Malvinas War demonstrated this, told he would not be able to fight for
the country he called home simply because he was Jewish and not criollo, a native Argentine of
European and particularly Spanish descent (although most Argentine Jews are in fact of
European ancestry). This chapter examines this antisemitic exclusion, arguing that the formation
of national unity during the Malvinas War built on Catholic religious discourse, and that this
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unity necessitated the exclusion of Jewish individuals like Eddi through antisemitism which
labeled Jews as untrustworthy foreigners.
History and Context of the Malvinas War
In commanding the invasion of the Malvinas Islands in 1982, the ruling military junta
capitalized on Argentina’s long-standing claim on the islands. Such a claim traced back to the
early colonial period, and disputes between the Spanish and British over the islands. Both nations
recorded discoveries of the islands in the 16th century, with the Spanish arguing that explorer
Ferdinand Magellan had discovered them in his journey around the southern tip of South
America in 1520. The British, on the other hand, countered that it was actually British Captain
John Davis who recorded the first discovery in 1592.125 Both the British and Spanish would
settle the islands in different periods of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, before the United
Provinces of the River Plate, precursor to the modern Argentine nation, would lay claim to the
islands.126 Despite this, the United Provinces of the River Plate never sent a governor to the
islands, and the few settlers remaining there were mostly British with a few French individuals as
well. In 1832, after French settlers and newly arrived Argentine colonists seized several
American sealing ships, the Americans would respond by burning the French settlement and
removing the few Argentines there.127 A year later, the British residents on the islands petitioned
the British government to form a permanent settlement on the islands, and from that point on the
British would control the islands, populated almost entirely by British residents.128
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Despite British control of the islands, the sovereignty dispute continued, linked to those
disagreements over the discovery of and early settlements on the islands. Argentina continued to
claim them, lodging a number of protests to the British government throughout the 19th
century.129 The British ignored these protests, but in the 1930s and the 1940s as the British
Empire began to dissolve, the relevancy of the Malvinas sovereignty dispute grew. When
Argentina joined the United Nations in 1945, it finally had an international body in which it
could voice its claims over the islands. Argentina continued to demand direct negotiations with
the British, which the UN sanctioned in 1965, commanding the two states to resolve the
sovereignty dispute peacefully. These talks, while representing a step forward, failed to make
any progress on the question of sovereignty over the islands.130
When the Argentine military took control of the country in 1976, the dispute over the
islands remained unresolved. The failure of diplomatic channels was a reflection of different
conceptions of what the main issue was relating to the sovereignty dispute. Argentine diplomats,
and much of the country, viewed the islands as an outdated relic of colonialism. British
governments and diplomats, on the other hand, viewed the dispute as an issue of selfdetermination.131 Both these viewpoints furthered each nation’s claim to the islands. If seen as a
relic of British colonialism, then it was natural that the islands should belong to the nation whose
territory was adjacent to the islands. If viewed as an issue of self-determination, then it was
obvious the islands should belong to the United Kingdom, given that nearly all the islanders were
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British and had expressed a desire to remain under British rule. These clashing viewpoints
naturally meant that diplomacy regularly led to frustration for both sides, even 15 years after
negotiations had begun.
The continued failure of diplomatic channels corresponded with the rise of extremist
military leaders within the Argentine government in the early 1980s, who opted to reject the use
of diplomatic channels and elected instead to use militaristic means to resolve the dispute over
the islands. While scholars and historians have disputed the main motivating factor behind the
invasion of the islands in April of 1982, there is no doubt that the move was widely popular
across Argentina. Many Argentines of the left, previously opponents and enemies of the military
state, supported the war as an anti-colonial struggle, while many Argentines of the right
supported the war as a display of nationalism and military power.132 The prevailing discourse in
the country surrounding the islands throughout the 20th century communicated an idea that the
country could not be “whole” until the islands were under Argentine control.133 This discourse
existed in schools across the country and further contributed to former targets of state repression,
such as exiles, leftists, and Jews, supporting the invasion.134 Given this widespread support, in
claiming the islands for Argentina, the Junta at least briefly improved their domestic image and
distracted the country from the human rights violations, economic failures, and overall poor
governance witnessed during the previous six years under military control.
While the invasion of the Malvinas Islands provided the military the opportunity to
increase their approval domestically and perhaps lengthen their stay in power, this hinged on
their ability to keep the islands from the British. The military government believed that the
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British would not respond if Argentina invaded and occupied the islands, and given that
diplomatic channels had failed, they argued that military action was the only way to resolve the
sovereignty dispute.135 Their belief that the British would not respond militarily, however, failed
to take into account a number of factors. First, that Britain’s conservative government under
Margaret Thatcher faced disapproval itself domestically, that the United States would side with
the British, and that Argentina was isolated diplomatically. War allowed Thatcher to improve her
own image, just as it did for the junta leaders, and the Argentine military was not prepared for
this.136 After occupying the islands for a little over a month, Argentine troops on the islands
faced regular bombardments from British planes, and the many teenage conscripts rushed to the
front had almost no training and poor equipment.137 Argentine resistance to the British response
lasted only a month, and in June of 1982 they would surrender. The islands would remain in
British hands, with Argentina’s defeat marking the beginning of the end of the military’s stay in
power.
Fostering Unity through Exclusion: Argentine Nationalism during the Malvinas War
In April of 1982, shortly after Argentine troops had arrived on the Malvinas Islands to
claim them for Argentina, President and head of the military junta Leopoldo Galtieri addressed
the nation from the balconies of the Casa Rosada (Argentina’s executive mansion).138 In his
speech, Galtieri spoke confidently, full of praise for the military and Argentina as a whole. He
expressed a sentiment of unity previously unseen in military discourse, highlighting the different
sectors of Argentine society that had gathered before him in the Plaza de Mayo and across the
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country to express support for the invasions of the Malvinas Islands: “Gathered here we have
workers, businessmen, intellectuals, all the orders of life in the national union working towards
the country’s well-being and dignity.”139 While Galtieri’s statement may not seem particularly
significant, it highlighted unity between groups that the regime had at times targeted as enemies
of the state. Workers, for example, and particularly workers’ unions, had faced state repression
regularly since the beginning of military rule in 1976. Between 1976 and 1983, the military
raided over 30% of the labor unions operating in the country at the time.140 Businessmen and
business interests, on the other hand, had been a traditional ally of the military regime under
President Jorge Videla (1976-1981), in some cases even helping the military by drawing up lists
of “subversives”, many of whom were sent to one of the regime’s many detention centers or who
simply disappeared.141 Leopoldo Galtieri and the military junta, including Navy commander
Jorge Anaya and Air Force brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, belonged to a more hardline wing of
the military which, like the extremist generals described in Chapter 2, was generally suspicious
of the business sector and its connections to foreign interests.
The last group Galtieri mentioned, intellectuals, faced harsh repression from the military
throughout its time in power. In being individuals who questioned, criticized, and analyzed
society and culture, intellectuals proposed new alternatives for how society, politics, and the
economy should function. Many Jewish individuals had formed part of this last group, enduring
the military’s crackdown on university learning and certain academic disciplines like psychology
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and sociology.142 To such individuals, Galtieri’s speech seemed to indicate that they would now
be included in a united Argentina in which all were welcome, even former enemies of the state.
In reality, the military’s efforts to foster national unity during the Malvinas War
necessitated the othering and exclusion of non-Catholic Argentines. The military used the war as
an opportunity to solidify a national identity strongly linked to Catholicism, which naturally
meant that Argentina’s Jews were not included within such a national identity. Galtieri’s
discourse reflected this, framing the conflict in religious terms as many other military and
religious leaders would do. Speaking of the invasion, Galtieri emphasized the religious nature of
Argentine society to his audience: “Tomorrow is Easter, tomorrow Sunday is Easter, so let the
Argentine nation which is profoundly religious and Catholic pray asking God for peace.”143
Encouraging the crowd gathered before him to pray, while speaking from the nation's most
important building, the Casa Rosada, had a clear symbolism to it. Argentines of all walks of life
and political beliefs stood together in prayer for the “recuperation” of the Malvinas Islands. In
this way, Galtieri established a link between Catholicism and nationalism. Both forces had united
the country behind the nation’s military, even though that same military had divided and
repressed much of the country over the past six years.
In describing Argentina as a Catholic country, Galtieri had implied that hundreds of
thousands of Argentine citizens did not form part of the nation. In a speech expressing and
advocating for unity, the President had excluded every non-Catholic Argentine in his view of the
nation. After receiving complaints of discrimination from local Jewish leaders, Galtieri would
eventually write a leader to the DAIA, the leading Jewish community organization in Buenos
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Aires, thanking it and the Jewish community for its support of the occupation of the islands.144
Even if Galtieri was willing to include and thank the Jewish community for its commitment to a
profoundly Argentine cause in private, he did not in public before thousands of Argentine
citizens. Such religious framing of the conflict, in relation to Catholic nationalism, required the
exclusion of Jewish and non-Catholic communities, representing a continuation of the idea,
present throughout the 20th century, of the Jewish community as a politically radical, “foreign”,
and secularizing “other” within Argentina.
The popularity of the war gave the military a chance to shape Argentina to their liking,
allowing them to disassociate Argentine identity with the many ideologies and groups they
rejected. The writers of Cabildo, always eager to express their views on the military’s ideological
and social projects, argued that the war presented Argentina with perhaps its last chance to
separate itself from all the “anti-Christian” ideologies that to them had corrupted Argentine
society throughout the 20th century. For Cabildo, the war and this process of forming a new
Argentine national identity “will be worth dying for it if it purifies us as a nation”.145 “Purifying”
Argentina meant distancing the nation from ideologies like democracy, religious pluralism,
liberalism, and any sort of leftist belief system. It meant solidifying a national identity based on
Catholicism, narrowing the definition of who was accepted as Argentine. If the early years of
repression and state-sponsored terrorism had been the beginning of this “purification” process for
the military, then the Malvinas War represented the culmination of this effort. Argentina’s Jews,
as a non-Catholic other living within the country, were one of such groups that the military
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distanced itself from, using the exclusion of the Jewish community to highlight this new
“purified” Catholic Argentine identity.
Fostering national unity and identity linked to Catholicism during the Malvinas War
required the support of the Catholic Church. The war thus also provided the military to improve
its relationship with the Church. Although Church leaders were largely supportive of or at least
silent before the military’s actions during the dictatorship, the growing unpopularity of the
military regime shortly before the war meant that the Church began to position itself as a sort of
mediator between civilian leaders advocating for democracy and the military.146 The Malvinas
War and the military’s ideological project during it, however, reestablished the traditional
alliance between the military and Church. Many Church leaders quickly came out in support of
the invasion of the islands with public statements, which served to strengthen the connection
between Catholicism and nationalism the military worked to cultivate at the outset of the
conflict. Catholic social organizations, like Acción Católica (Catholic Action), expressed similar
support of the invasion, framing the conflict in religious terms like many military leaders did:
“The coincidence of this event, so dear to the dignity of Argentines, with the celebration of
Easter, the great Christian festival, is motive for reflection in order to discover the profound
sense of our national identity. We ask the people of the Nation to pray to Christ...to illuminate
our hearts and wills, and to share in the fundamental values of our Argentinidad; we are capable
of recreating a responsible Fatherland under his sovereignty”.147 The timing of the invasion,
occurring the week of Easter 1982, to Catholic Action, indicated a sort of divine importance to
the Argentine cause, as it did to Galtieri and the military. Such statements of support
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demonstrated the renewal of the traditional Church-military alliance, emphasizing the
importance of Catholicism for national unity while requiring the exclusion of non-Catholic
Argentines.
The Church-military alliance, however, went far beyond discourse, demonstrated in
particular by the chaplains serving in the military. Priests that served in the military as chaplains
were not considered civilians, but rather an integral part of the institution which received the
same state-sponsored benefits as soldiers and generals alike.148 Military chaplains, in addition to
attending to the spiritual needs of the members of the military, taught courses on Catholicism and
generally influenced the military with their own viewpoints and interpretations of the religion.149
Their teachings contributed to the establishment of the military as a firmly Catholic institution,
with no place for religious minorities. Until the 1990s, candidates for the National Military
College had to present proof of baptism to gain admittance, thus preventing non-Catholics from
becoming officers there.150 At the time of the Malvinas War, the military was a homogeneous
institution, whose demographics did not reflect that of the nation as a whole. This homogeneity
contributed to the antisemitic reactions many military commanders had to the presence of Jewish
conscripts in the military during the war, as they rejected the idea of a religiously and culturally
pluralist military and country.
The military’s goal of forming a sense of national unity and identity linked to
Catholicism during the Malvinas War necessitated the exclusion of Argentina’s Jews. All those
who were Catholic seemed to be part of the nation, even former enemies of the military state,
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while non-Catholics remained on the outside. It mattered little that many non-Catholics, like
Marcelo Eddi, expressed support for the war and considered themselves to be nationalists. The
military’s ideological project required that such individuals kept their status as a “foreign”, not
fully Argentine, other. The antisemitism Jewish conscripts experienced while serving in the
military during the Malvinas War demonstrated this idea, showing that the war represented a
continuation of the othering of Jews as a politically radical, “foreign”, and secularizing force.
Antisemitic Exclusion during the Malvinas War
The presence of Jews within the military during the Malvinas War caused discomfort for
some military commanders, to the point that many expressed surprise upon meeting Jewish
conscripts at military bases in Patagonia. Pablo Macharowski, one of the roughly 200 Jewish
conscripts who participated in the war, witnessed such sentiments from one of his superiors, who
commented to him that it was “odd” that he was Jewish and fighting for Argentina in the war.151
Military superiors struggled to fathom that it was possible to be Argentine and Jewish, or that it
was possible to be Jewish and live outside of Israel. Such ignorance contributed to and reflected
a view of Argentine Jews as foreigners, even as they trained and fought alongside Catholic
soldiers in Patagonia and on the Malvinas Islands. As this section discusses, this view of Jews as
non-Argentine led some military officials to be suspicious of their Jewish conscripts’ loyalty and
trustworthiness, and Jewish individuals therefore received extra attention from their superiors
who kept a close watch on their actions and movements within military spaces. Such
antisemitism alienated Jewish conscripts, isolating them as an untrustworthy non-Argentine
other. This isolation was essential in constructing an Argentine identity and sense of unity linked
to Catholicism.
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The antisemitism Jewish conscripts and soldiers experienced during the Malvinas War
occurred within an institution in which mistreatment and abuse were commonplace. Even before
the war, military superiors used their position of power within the institution to make their
subordinates suffer, often through overly demanding physical activity done in little clothing or in
the cold.152 Jewish conscripts and soldiers, however, recall experiencing added abuse from their
superiors, which also included physical exercise, withdrawal or even stealing of food, and sexual
abuse in the most extreme case. Silvio Katz was one Jewish conscript who detailed this
additional abuse decades after the end of the war: “Every day we were on the island, he
(Lieutenant Eduardo Flores Ardoino) punished me for being a Jew. He froze my hands and head
in ice water. He threw my food in shit and forced me to pick it up with my mouth. He gloated
about what he did and was happy to see me suffer. He told me that he would have done the same
to the others, if they had been Jewish too.”153 Lieutenant Ardoino’s treatment of Katz was visibly
antisemitic, as it targeted a Jewish conscript in a different, harsher way than non-Jewish
conscripts. While Flores Ardoino did not make comments labeling Katz as a foreigner, his
actions still marginalized Katz in communicating to him that he was different from the other
conscripts and thus not accepted by his superiors or even as an Argentine. Katz, similarly, felt he
was punished for being Jewish, a view that reflected the lieutenant’s statement that he would
have treated the other soldiers in the same way if they had been Jewish too. By mistreating Jews
in different or more harmful ways than the rest of their subordinates, military commanders
therefore signaled in their actions that Jews were “foreigners”. These actions excluded and
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marginalized Jewish conscripts, fostering an Argentine and military identity in opposition to
such “foreigners”.
Commentary from military superiors often explicitly demonstrated a belief that Jews
were not Argentine and did not belong in the military. For example, one official told a Jewish
soldier that he should “go defend his own country”, once again reflecting an idea that Jews could
not be Argentine because they had their “own country”, Israel.154 In late April 1982, when
several Jewish rabbis arrived in Patagonia to provide spiritual guidance and assistance to Jewish
members of the military, they would receive questions on Israel and “foreign opinion” on the
Malvinas War, further implying a belief that Jews were foreign or at least had greater access to
the international community.155 This notion existed beyond military bases in society as a whole.
Even in Argentina’s cosmopolitan capital of Buenos Aires, the Jewish community felt pressure
to publicly show its support for the invasion of and war over the islands. Even when DAIA
(Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas), one of the community’s leading
organizations, had expressed its support for the invasion of the islands in a letter to the Junta, this
pressure continued as the military leaders took the letter as permission to try and get the
organization to participate in public demonstrations in support of the Argentine cause.156 In the
same way that some military officials believed that Jewish soldiers and conscripts could not be
truly or fully Argentine, the military government’s pressure on Jewish organizations to show
public support for the war effort demonstrated that the government did not view Jews as fully
Argentine or patriotic unless they had “proof”. Catholic organizations in the country did not face
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the same scrutiny, given the military’s view that Catholics were fully Argentine and thus
“naturally” supportive of the military’s decision to invade the islands.157 This double standard,
just like the cruel treatment Jewish conscripts endured while serving with the military, alienated
and reminded the Jewish community that it was not accepted by all Argentines.
Coupled with this idea of Jews as foreigners was the notion that Jewish individuals were
untrustworthy and even spies. For instance, such distrust of Jews was so firm in the mindset of
one military official that he even refused treatment from a Jewish doctor after an injury in
combat training, stating “the only thing missing in my life was a Jew coming to cure me. I have
to endure this Jewish son of a b***h giving me antibiotics”.158 The implication from the
official’s statement was that somehow an Argentine doctor could not be trusted simply because
they were Jewish. Clearly there was an underlying view of Jews as untrustworthy, to the point
that there seemed to be a negative connotation to the word “judío” (Jew) when such military
officials used it. When Jewish soldiers went to meet with the rabbis that had traveled to
Patagonia to accompany them, non-Jewish military superiors would stand alongside their
soldiers in some of their consultations with the rabbis and would even tell them they must speak
Spanish. Such military members considered Jews as untrustworthy because they did not view
them as Argentine, a view perhaps accentuated in this period by the strong anti-foreign sentiment
existent in Argentine society. As a reflection of this anti-foreign sentiment, several companies
with English names switched to Spanish ones and ads in Argentine newspapers highlighted
Argentina’s “self-sufficiency”, despite the fact that the military government received significant
amounts of foreign aid from the United States and ironically bought most of its weapons from
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Israel.159 This wider atmosphere in society was clearly present within the military at bases in
Patagonia and on the Malvinas Islands during the war. Military commanders viewed their Jewish
conscripts as untrustworthy, signaling to them with their actions, riddled with antisemitism, that
they would not be accepted as fully Argentine.
The idea of Jewish individuals as untrustworthy also connected to religious discourse and
conspiracies. These conspiracies added “evidence” to the supposed deceitfulness or malevolence
of the Jewish people, none more so than the idea that Jews were responsible for the death of
Christ. This conspiracy appeared not only in interactions with Argentines Jews, but also in arms
deals with Israeli officials. One military captain even refused to buy weapons from Israel before
the war, telling the Israelis he met with that he blamed them for the death of Christ: “we will
never buy [weapons] from you, because you are Jewish and killed Christ”.160 The fact that a
military captain would say this to Israelis indicates that this was a firmly held belief, and not just
some contrived way to exclude and alienate Jewish individuals in the Argentine military.
Nevertheless, many Jews in the Argentine military received similar comments from their
superiors, blaming them for having killed Christ. While this form of antisemitism went hand in
hand with certain Catholic religious discourses, it only served to further the idea of Jews as
foreign and untrustworthy. If Jews were viewed as responsible for the death of Christ, a central
figure to the Catholic religion, and if Argentina was considered by many in the military to be a
Catholic country, then how could a Jew be Argentine, or be trusted in the defense of Argentina
during wartime? The antisemitism that Jews faced was thus all interrelated. Considering them
foreign and untrustworthy coupled with this belief that Jewish individuals were responsible for
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the death of Christ, and connected to the religious discourse and imagery that military leaders
used when framing the Malvinas War.
The antisemitism that Jewish conscripts endured while fighting for Argentina preserved
and built on the idea, present throughout the 20th century, that Jews were a not fully Argentine,
politically radical, and foreign other. Military commanders through cruel treatment and
antisemitic comments signaled this reality to their Jewish conscripts, while other commanders
demonstrated a blatant mistrust of such conscripts. The anti-foreign sentiment that spread
through Argentine society during the war meant that Jews were an easy target and scapegoat for
military commanders, especially as it became clear by late May of 1982 that Argentina would
lose the war. Increasingly hopeless military leaders, therefore, took out some of their anger and
frustration on those who they viewed as non-Argentine, their Jewish conscripts.161 All this
clearly indicated that the national unity fostered by the Malvinas War did not extend to Jewish
individuals, and instead necessitated the preservation of Jews as an other within Argentina.
Conclusion
President Galtieri’s speech in April of 1982, shortly after Argentina had occupied the
Malvinas Islands, expressed a sense of unity missing during the previous six years of the military
dictatorship. Galtieri seemed to extend an olive branch to sectors of society once targeted by the
military and considered enemies of the state. The military government now considered workers,
businessmen, and intellectuals as part of a united Argentina standing up to a potent foreign
power in Great Britain. The national unity Galtieri advocated for, however, also excluded those
the military did not consider to be Argentine. While Galtieri encouraged unity across different
sectors of Argentine society, he was careful to describe Argentina as a Catholic country. Such a
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view left non-Catholic Argentines, including the hundreds of thousands of Jewish individuals
living in the country, in a difficult position. Many Argentine Jews by the 1970s and 1980s were
already third or even fourth generation Argentines, with a strong attachment to the South
American nation.162 Most were monolingual Spanish speakers and had assimilated into
Argentine society. Outside of religion, there was little distinguishing a Jewish Argentine from
the Catholic majority. Nevertheless, Galtieri’s comments and the religious framing of the war
would exclude the country’s large Jewish minority, signaling to them that they remained an other
within Argentine society. The military’s efforts to consolidate a national identity linked to
Catholicism during the war required the continued othering of Jews as foreigners, an othering
begun long before in the early 1900s during the Semana Trágica.
Their hopes of creating a truly Catholic Argentina built on the religious framing of the
Malvinas War, and provided the military the chance to rekindle their alliance with the Catholic
Church. The traditional Church-military alliance present throughout much of the 20th century
had deteriorated as the many human rights violations of the military state came to light in the late
1970s, but the Malvinas War did away with Church leaders’ hesitation about military rule.163
Had Argentina been successful in the war, it may have given the military the chance to stay in
power, especially given that the military leaders in control at the time were not supportive of a
transition to democracy.164 Instead, their heavy defeat in the war led to protests against the
military regime, and the beginning of the path towards democracy, which would finally arrive in
1983.
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The experience of the roughly 200 Jewish conscripts who participated in the Malvinas
War, coupled with the religious framing of the conflict, was a clear demonstration of the
continuation of the status of Jews as a foreign, politically radical, and secularizing other within
Argentina. Military commanders, through cruel treatment and antisemitic comments, signaled to
their Jewish conscripts that they were “foreigners” and untrustworthy. That is not to say that nonJewish conscripts did not face mistreatment and abuse from their superiors, but the treatment
Jewish individuals endured was often harsher and more directed. Such conscripts, as veterans,
received little help from the state and society as a whole after the war. Much of society would
view veterans as ideologically suspect for participating in the war, especially given the war’s
association with the dictatorship, and their often nationalistic defense of it afterwards, while the
military censored their ability to speak of the hardships endured on the ground on the islands.
Many veterans thus found it impossible to find employment after the war, and passed into a state
of depression, so much so that some would eventually commit suicide. Only in the early 2000s
did some veterans have the legal recourse to bring forward and describe the mistreatment they
received at the hands of their superiors.165 Shortly afterwards, the antisemitism Jewish conscripts
faced on the islands would also come to light, as veterans finally received some attention from
society and the state.
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Conclusion: The Jewish Other in Argentina
From the events of the Semana Trágica of 1919 to the Malvinas War of 1982, the
conceptions associated with the Argentine Jewish community and the antisemitism directed
towards it would regularly shift and take on different forms. In that first period in the early 20th
century, traditionally powerful Argentine social actors, like the Catholic Church, upper-class
elite, and military, framed and defined a Jewish Question that argued that the Jewish community
was a “problem” threatening their dominance in society and traditional Argentine values. At the
time, these social actors responded to the economic success of some Jewish immigrants, arrival
of new ideologies like communism and anarchism in Argentina, and concerns over uncontrolled
immigration. The violence of the Semana Trágica represented an instance in which the Catholic
Church, upper class elite, military, and Radical Party government used such aspects of the
Jewish Question to maintain their position of dominance in Argentina. The definitions associated
with and framing of the Jewish Question began the process of othering the Jewish community as
a politically radical, secularizing, and foreign “other” living within Argentina.
During the government of Juan Perón in the 1940s and 1950s, the Jewish community’s
status as an other remained. Perón capitalized on this, actively seeking Jewish support within the
political ideology associated with his regime, Peronism. Jewish involvement in Peronism
demonstrated Perón’s rejection of traditional social actors like the Church and upper-class elite.
It similarly emphasized the secular nature of his state and the importance of loyalty to him in a
Peronist Argentina. The Jewish community’s status as a secularizing, political radical, and
foreign other therefore helped Perón construct a new Argentine identity separated from
traditional, conservative ones, linked to a political ideology rather than a religious or ethnic
background.
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Despite the opportunity present for Jewish individuals to finally participate within
Argentine nationalism and form part of the nation, antisemitism was commonplace in the country
in the form of attacks on Jewish individuals by far-right nationalist organizations. One of these
groups, the ALN (Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista), formed part of Perón’s political base. At
the same time, Perón was eager to improve relations with the United States, and thus had to
strike a balance between condemning antisemitism without compromising support from
antisemitic actors within his base. This “balancing act” would be present for governments in the
1950s and 1960s as well. The democratic government of Arturo Frondizi, for example, regularly
condemned antisemitic attacks on Jewish merchants and invididuals, yet never took action
against antisemitic groups like the nationalist organization Tacuara. Tacaura’s use in reducing
communist influences in society, as well as its personal and ideological connections to the
military, meant that Frondizi was either unable or unwilling to curb Tacuara activities. In the late
1960s, under the military government of General Juan Carlos Onganía, Tacuara continued to
influence Argentine society, with former members serving as informants for the regime. The
Onganía government was also eager to reduce the influence of communism in Argentina, and
sought to consolidate a truly Catholic nation. Given this, the Jewish community remained
excluded from national identity, still a foreign, secularizing other not worth full protection from
antisemitic actors like Tacuara.
During the military dictatorship of the late 1970s and early 1980s, certain military leaders
continued to view the Jewish community as a dangerous, foreign other within Argentina. Such
military leaders, like head of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Ramón J. Camps or Third Army
corps commander Luciano Benjamin Menéndez, linked Argentina’s Jews to an antisemitic
conspiracy of international Jewish power. Such commanders argued that Jewish individuals were
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connected both to leftist groups and ideologies as well as foreign powers like the United States,
Israel, and the Soviet Union. Their antisemitism was what drove such extremist figures to
attempt to access greater power within the military, like when Menéndez led a failed revolt in
Córdoba in 1979, reacting to the placement of Jewish journalist Jacobo Timerman under house
arrest. More “moderate” military figures also used antisemitism as a tool for accessing or
maintaining power during the dictatorship. President Jorge Videla tactically opposed
antisemitism during his time in power, censoring the far-right magazine Cabildo, working
towards Timerman’s release, and even proposing an anti-discrimination law for the country.
These actions helped Videla style himself as a moderate within the military and maintain a
strong alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, Videla did little to improve the situation of
Jewish individuals who endured antisemitic rhetoric and abuse while in military prisons. The
Jewish community remained a foreign and politically radical other, still not worth full protection
from the military government.
During the Malvinas War of 1982, military “moderates” like Videla were no longer in
power, and instead hardline, nationalist military commanders Leopoldo Galtieri and Jorge Anaya
led the country.166 The invasion of the islands, widely supported across Argentina, initially
boosted the military’s reputation. Military leaders like Galtieri, riding this wave of newfound
public support, spoke of national unity across Argentina, even among sectors that had previously
been victims of state-led repression. The unity that he and the military hoped to foster, however,
was exclusionary, and corresponded with efforts to consolidate a national identity linked with
Catholicism. The formation of such a national identity necessitated the exclusion of the Jewish
other, with national identity formed in opposition to this internal threat. The experience of Jewish
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conscripts who served in the military during the Malvinas War demonstrated this, as their
superiors singled them out as “untrustworthy foreigners”. The religious framing of the conflict
further marginalized Argentina’s Jews, many of whom were eager to show their support for the
Malvinas cause.167 The military’s ideological project during the war thus maintained and
emphasized the idea of the politically radical, foreign, and secularizing Jewish other, conceived
in the early 20th century.
This project, beyond revealing the continued presence of antisemitism and anti-Jewish
exclusion in Argentine society throughout the 20th century, has approached Argentine history
and the country’s last military dictatorship in a different manner. It has shown the influence the
so-called Jewish Question and antisemitism had in shaping such periods of history. While the
Jewish community largely lacked agency in many of these periods compared to governmental
actors, there is no doubt that they were present and active in Argentine society throughout the
20th century. The presence of the community and their importance to Argentina caused different
governments to interact with and approach the Jewish community in distinct ways, at times
seeking to include them within political ideologies like Peronism or explicitly seeking to exclude
them from ideologies like Catholic nationalism. These interactions helped shape Argentine
identity under Perón, the military regime of the 1960s, the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s,
and during the Malvinas War, even if Jewish individuals were often not included within such
identities. In this way, this project has attempted to show the importance the Jewish community
had in shaping and defining Argentine history during the 20th century and especially in the last
military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s.
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